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COMMENTS

The Right to Die in Illinois: A
Comprehensive Scheme
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are attending a Chicago Bears - New York
Giants football game. It's a very intense game and since intense games
always make you hungry, you order a hot dog from the vendor.
About three bites into your hot dog, Walter Payton breaks loose for
a big gain. You jump up from your seat to cheer him on, and as you
do, you inhale your hot dog. You break out in a cold sweat and
realize that you can't breathe. You begin trying to get someone's
attention, motioning for help, but your pleas for assistance go unanswered and you slowly begin to fade to black. A crowd of fans circle
around you, unsure of what to do.
Unbeknownst to you, twelve minutes after your collapse a paramedic team clears your airway, defibrilates your heart, and provides
you with artificial ventilation. You are transported to the hospital
and attached to a mechanical respirator. A neurologist examines you
and makes a preliminary diagnosis that you have suffered irreversible
brain damage due to the several minutes your brain was without
oxygen. You are not brain dead,' but instead are in a persistent
1. If the patient is "brain dead" then there is no legal question relating to
whether life-sustaining treatment may be removed. The President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
(hereinafter President's Commission) issued a report in July, 1981 entitled Defining
Death. The President's Commission advocated the following "Uniform Determination
of Death Act" to be adopted in all jurisdictions within the United States: "An
individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and

respiratory functions or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in
accordance with accepted medical standards." President's Commission, A Report on
the Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death: Defining Death
2 (1981). For a general discussion of brain death, see G. ANDERSON AND V. GLESNESANDERSON, HEALTH CARE ETmICS: A GUIDE FOR DECISION MAKERS 152-74 (1987)
[hereinafter Anderson].
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vegetative state 2 with no hope of ever returning to a cognitive state.3
Your spouse is called in and given the sad news. The doctors try to
be optimistic with your spouse and adopt a wait-and-see posture, but
several months later you are still attached to that respirator. Your
spouse approaches the doctor regarding withdrawing you from the
respirator and "allowing nature to take its course." What result?
The answer to this question depends on what state you are in:
New Jersey (where the Giants play) or Illinois. If you are in New
Jersey, there are guidelines that have been developed by that state's
supreme court to assist your spouse in making such a difficult
decision.4 If you are in Illinois and you have indicated your intent to
be withdrawn from death-delaying procedures5 by executing a valid
2. A person in a "persistent vegetative state" is a "subject who remains with
the capacity to maintain the vegetative parts of neurological function but who ...
no longer has any cognitive function." In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 24, 355 A.2d 647,
654, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See infra note 44. See also generally President's
Commission, A Report on the Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues in Treatment
Decisions: Deciding to Forego Life Sustaining Treatment (1983).
3. A person in a cognitive state, as contrasted with a person in a persistent
vegetative state, possesses cognitive abilities that include talking, seeing, feeling,
singing, and thinking. 70 N.J. 10, 24, 355 A.2d 647, 654.
4. The New Jersey Supreme Court has had the opportunity to decide several
cases involving patients' rights vis-a-vis withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining
medical procedures. As a result, state courts often look to New Jersey case law for
guidance in resolving such issues. See, e.g., In re Prange, 166 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 520
N.E.2d 946 (1988); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1988); Rasmussen
v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me.
1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986);
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Barber
v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); In re Storar,
52 N.Y. 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
5. For purposes of this article, the terms "life-sustaining," "life-support,"
and "death-delaying" will be synonymous. As originally enacted, the Illinois Living
Will Act used the term life-sustaining to describe medical procedures used to maintain
an incapacitated individual's vital processes. In 1987 the Illinois Legislature enacted
Public Act 85-860, amending the Living Will Act by substituting the term lifesustaining with the term death-delaying, the apparent reasoning being that the term
life-sustaining connotes that the procedure is a temporary one that is being utilized
until an individual is capable of functioning on his own. President's Commission,
supra note 2, at 2 n. 1. An example of this is a patient who is put on a heart-lung
machine during heart surgery - that patient is undergoing life-sustaining medical
treatment until he is able to function on his own. The same procedure utilized on an
individual with no hope of ever functioning on his own is not life-sustaining treatment
because it is not temporary; there is no life to sustain. Instead the procedure is being
used to delay the individual's death. The majority of jurisdictions and the bulk of
the literature in the area continues to employ the terms life-sustaining and life-support
and therefore they are used synonymously with death-delaying in this article.
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"living will,"6 you will be withdrawn from life-support and nature
can take its course. If you don't have a living will or yours is found
to be invalid, it is uncertain what will be done with your life-sustaining
treatment. 7 This is because neither the Illinois Legislature nor the
Illinois Supreme Court have established guidelines for making decisions in these situations.
This article will examine the withholding or withdrawal8
of life-

sustaining medical procedures from chronically or terminally ill patients 9
or patients in a persistent vegetative state. This article consists of four
sections: a brief background of the problem; an analysis of how the
New Jersey Supreme Court (acting in a state that has not yet adopted
a "living will" statute) has resolved certain critical issues related to
the problem; a discussion and analysis of how the Illinois Legislature

6. The Illinois Living Will Act (hereinafter "Act") is found at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110 1/2, para. 701-10 (1985) (amended 1987). The Act, as originally enacted, is
set out in Appendix A. The 1987 amendments to the Act are set out in Appendix B.
7. The Act provides the manner in which an individual establishes a living
will and delineates the conditions an restrictions imposed upon the operation of the
living will. The Act does not address the situation where an individual without a
living will becomes incapacitated and cannot make a decision regarding his withdrawal
from death-delaying procedures. The Illinois Supreme Court has not addressed this
issue and therefore it is not certain what rights a person without a valid living will
has with respect to his ability to withdraw from death-delaying medical procedures.
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division recently decided the
case In re Prange, 166 IUl. App. 3d 1091, 520 N.E.2d 966 (1988). See infra notes 195220 and accompanying text. The only other Illinois case where a court has approached
the issue of withdrawing an individual from artificial life support is In re Haymer,
115 I11.
App. 3d 349, 450 N.E.2d 940 (1983). This case involved a hospital's attempt
to have a child removed from artificial life support, alleging that the child was dead.
The child's parents opposed the assertion that the child was dead. The court held
"[tlhat a person is legally dead if he or she has sustained either (1) irreversible
cessation of total brain function, according to usual and customary standards of
medical practice, or (2) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions
according to usual and customary standards of medical practice. Id. at 355, 450
N.E.2d at 945 (1983). The Illinois legislature has codified a brain death definition of
death at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2 para. 302(b) (1985). Paragraph 302(b) provides
that for purposes of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,
para. 301-11 (1985)) death is defined as "the irreversible cessation of total brain
function, according to usual and customary standards of medical practice."
8. Withholding of treatment indicates that treatment was never applied to the
patient. Withdrawal of treatment indicates that the treatment was initiated but was
subsequently stopped. President's Commission, supra note 2, at 73-77.
9. A chronic illness is an illness that progresses slowly and is of a long
duration. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, LAWYERS EDITION 278 (5th ed. 1982). A
terminal illness is an illness that will necessarily end the patient's life. Id. at 1418.
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and courts have approached the problem; and a conclusion that
suggests a course of action the Illinois Legislature, being the proper
forum, must implement to rectify problems in this area.
II. BACKGROUND
The problems encountered in the area of withholding or with-

drawal of treatment from chronic or terminally ill patients or patients
in a persistent vegetative state are relatively new concerns facing
society. Two major factors have combined to create this dilemma:
medical advancement and the increasing recognition of individual
rights by the courts.
Generally, medical science has progressed dramatically over the
past ninety years.' 0 Surgical procedures have been refined, drugs and
vaccines have been discovered and developed, and machines have been
created to maintain an incapacitated individual's vital processes." The
specific end result of these general advancements has been to radically
2
alter three factors: how, at what age, and where people die.'
In 1900 the leading causes of death for persons in the United
States were influenza and pneumonia. 3 Individuals who contracted
these diseases died relatively quickly as there was nothing medically
that could be done for them.' 4 In contrast, in 1982 the leading causes
of death in the United States were heart disease and cancer. These
are illnesses that are usually acquired later in life and progress at a
6
slow rate, allowing time for some medical intervention. It is not
uncommon for an individual undergoing medical treatment for one
illness to be besieged by other ailments. ' 7 The end result is that not
only are people living longer, 8 but are dying, not of diseases that
strike quickly and kill suddenly, but rather of diseases that progress
10. See generally J.
(1976).

BORDLEY &

A.

HARvEy,

Two

CENTURIES OF

AmEP.CAN

MEDICINE

11. Id.

12. President's Commission, supra note 2, at 16-18.
13. Id. at 16.
14. Id.
15. Public Health Service, Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion,
U.S. Dept of Health and Human Services, Prevention '84/'85 15 (1985).
16. President's Commission, supra note 2, at 16.
17. Id.
18. The average life expectancy of a person born in the United States in 1900
was 49.2 years. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1986, at 783 (H. Lane
26th ed. 1985). The average life expectancy of a person born in the United States in
1983 was 74.5 years. Id.
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gradually and can be slowed further by medical intervention. 19 This
is highlighted by the fact that approximately 800o of the deaths in
the United States now occur in either hospitals or nursing homes. 20
Additionally, there are those individuals who are not victims of
disease, but rather are victims of accidents that have left them in a
persistent vegetative state. Many of these individuals require a mechanical respirator to provide their ventilation. 21 Under the outdated
medical standard that utilized a "spontaneous breathing" test to
determine death, these individuals would have been declared dead. 2
Now, as a result of the advancement of medical technology, physicians
are able to ascertain if an individual has some brain activity.23 Under
the new standard of death,24 as long as any brain activity exists the
individual cannot be declared dead. 25 By definition, an individual in
a persistent vegetative state is alive because his brain shows some
activity. 26 As a result,' a patient in this condition, attached to a
respirator or being provided with artificial hydration and nutrition,
may be capable of living out his natural life without ever returning
27
to a cognitive state.
It is apparent that the advancement of medical science has
contributed to the complexity of the problem. Another factor contributing to the problem has been the court's increasing recognition of
19. President's Commission, supra note 2, at 16.
20. Id. at 18 n.12.
21. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 25, 355 A.2d 647, 655, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
22. In the introduction to Defining Death, the President's Commission stated:
The accepted standard for determining death has been the permanent absence
of respiration and circulation. A question arises about continued reliance
on the traditional standard because advances in medical technique now
permit physicians to generate breathing and heartbeat when the capacity to
breathe spontaneously has been irretrievably lost. Prior to the advent of
current technology, breathing ceased and death was obvious. Now, however,
certain organic processes in these bodies can be maintained through artificial
means, although they will never recover the capacity for spontaneous
breathing or sustained integration of bodily functions, for consciousness, or
for other human experiences.
President's Commission, supra note 1, at 3. The President's Commission found this
"spontaneous breathing" standard of death to be outdated, and therefore advocated
a new standard of death. See supra note 1.
23. President's Commission, supra note 1, at 24-25.
24. The definition of death as promulgated by the President's Commission,
supra note 1.
25. President's Commission, supra note 1, at 81-84.
26. Id. at 18.
27. Id.
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individual rights. In 1914 Judge (later Justice) Cardozo stated that
every person "of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine

what should be done with his own body

....

",28

This common law

principle has been extensively followed and expounded on by other
courts. 29

More recently, the United States Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut,30 found the unwritten constitutional right of privacy to

exist in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights
"formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance." 3 ' Expanding upon this right of privacy, the Court

has held that an individual has the right to possess and use contraceptives,3 2 and that a woman has the right under certain circumstances
to terminate a pregnancy."
As an outgrowth of these legal developments, patients (or their

guardians) have petitioned the courts demanding the right to control
their medical treatment.3 4 More specifically, patients have petitioned
the courts insisting that they be allowed to terminate their lifesustaining treatment and to allow nature to take its course." A further
extension is where an incompetent3 6 patient's guardian, family mem28. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 130, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914).
29. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Rivers v. Katz,
67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266 (1981); Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hosp., 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199 (1924);
Murtha v. New York Homeopathic Medical College & Flower Hosp., 228 N.Y. 183,
126 N.E. 722 (1920).
30. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
31. Id. at 484.
32. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. See cases cited supra note 29.
35. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Tune v. Walter
Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985); Bartling v. Superior
Ct., 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.
2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
36. A competent patient has a clear understanding of the nature of his or her
illness and prognosis, and of the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment, and
has the capacity to reason and make judgments about that information. In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 347, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985), citing Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford,
Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Tarssig & Van Eys, "The Physician's
Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients," 310 New Eng. J. Med. 955, 957
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ber, or friend petitions the court on behalf of the patient, asking that
the patient be withdrawn from life-sustaining treatment.3 7

Many of the courts that have addressed issues within this area
have done so reluctantly, indicating that this is an area of concern
more appropriately left to the legislature. 31 In addressing this concern
the Florida Supreme Court stated:
Because the issue with all its ramifications is fraught with
complexity and encompasses the interests of the law, both civil

and criminal, medical ethics and social morality, it is not one
which is well-suited for resolution in an adversary judicial
proceeding. It is the type [of] issue which is more suitably
addressed in the legislative forum, where fact finding can be

less confined and the viewpoints of all interested institutions
and disciplines can be presented and synthesized. In this

manner only can the subject be dealt with comprehensively

and the interests of all institutions and individuals be properly
39
accommodated.

In addition to the unique fact finding capabilities of a legislature,
there is an even more compelling reason why the legislature must
address the issue; far too often the patient seeking relief in the court
(1984). The opposite of a competent patient is an incompetent patient. An incompetent
patient may be one who was never competent to make such a decision or one who
was once competent but has been rendered incompetent through an injury or illness.
See generally Anderson, supra note 1, at 127-37.
37. See, e.g., In re Prange, 166 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 520 N.E.2d 946 (1988); In
re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1988); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz.
207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); In re Peter, 108
N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 441 (1987);
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re
Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629,
405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426
N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Com. PI 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
38. See, e.g., In re Prange, 166 Il. App. 3d 1091, 520 N.E.2d 946 (1988); In
re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d
1209 (1985); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); In re Barber,
147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Severns v.
Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980), Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.
2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
39. 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980).
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proceeding dies before a decision can be rendered. 40 The New Jersey
Supreme Court, addressing this concern, stated:
No matter how expedited, judicial intervention in this complex
and sensitive area may take too long. Thus, it could infringe
the very rights that we want to protect. The mere prospect of
a cumbersome, intrusive, and expensive court proceeding during such an emotional and upsetting period in the lives of a
patient and his or her loved ones would undoubtedly deter
many persons from deciding to discontinue treatment. And
even if the patient or the family were willing to submit to such
would neva proceeding, it is likely that the patient's rights
4'
deliberation.
judicial
by
ertheless be frustrated
III.

How

THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT HAS APPROACHED THE

PROBLEM

In resolving cases regarding the withholding or withdrawing of
death delaying medical procedures, the New Jersey Supreme Court
42
has identified several factors as being critical to the analysis. First,
is the patient competent or incompetent? If the patient is incompetent,
is he incompetent because he is in a persistent vegetative state as a
result of an accident or is he incompetent due to a chronic or terminal
illness? Second, where is the patient located? Is he at home, in a
hospital, or in a nursing home-type situation? Third, how old is the
patient? Finally, what countervailing state interests are present? Are
these countervailing interests superior to the individual's rights?
The following case summaries demonstrate the court's attention
to the particular facts unique to each case. Because the court utilized
this approach, the holdings were necessarily limited in their scope.
This has necessitated re-litigation of cases that were similar to, but
not exactly the same, as previously decided cases.
40. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 357, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (1987). See, e.g., In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 342, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985); Bartling v. Superior Court,
163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 189, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 221 (1986); Corbett v. D'Allessandro,
487 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), rehg. denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986);
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984); In
re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 811, 689 P.2d 1372, 1374 (1984); In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 369 n.1, 420 N.E.2d 64, 66 n.1, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 268 n.1, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980); In re Spring,
380 Mass. 629, 631 n.1, 405 N.E.2d 115, 118 n.1 (1980); Saikewicz v. Superintendent
of Belchertown State School, 373 Mass. 728, 734, 370 N.E.2d 417, 422 (1977).
41. Farrell, 108 N.J. at 357, 529 A.2d at 415.
42. See infra notes 140-163 and accompanying text.

1988:4271

A.

LIVING WILLS

INCOMPETENT/PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE/HOSPITAL
SETTING: IN RE QUINLAM 3

Karen Ann Quinlan was a 22 year-old in a persistent vegetative
state."4 Situated in a hospital, Ms. Quinlan's ventilation was assisted
by a mechanical respirator. 4 5 Her father sought to be appointed as
the guardian over her person and the express power from the court
to have the mechanical respirator withdrawn from his daughter.4 The
trial court denied the petition, stating that "[i]t is a medical decision
whether or not Karen should be removed from the respirator. ' 47 The
supreme court rejected this analysis and allowed the relief the petitioner requested, with modifications .48
In arriving at its decision, the court held that Ms. Quinlan had a
personal privacy right to deny herself medical care, and that she did
49
not lose this right when she became incompetent to exercise the right.
43. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).

44. A person in a "persistent vegetative state" is a "subject who remains with

the capacity to maintain the vegetative parts of neurological function but who ...
no longer has any cognitive function." Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654. One of the

neurological experts who examined Ms. Quinlan was Dr. Fred Plum. Dr. Plum is
Professor and Chairman of the Department of Neurology at Cornell, and a world
renowned expert on the persistent vegetative state. He is the individual who created
the term and is the author of several treatises and numerous articles explaining it. It

was his definition of persistent vegetative state that the court accepted here and later
in a recent case, In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). Dr. Plum, in
testimony regarding the difference between brain death and the persistent vegetative

state indicated that the brain works in essentially two ways, the vegetative and the

sapient (cognitive). He testified:

We have an internal vegetative regulation which controls body temperature,
which controls breathing, which controls to a considerable degree blood
pressure, which controls to some degree heart rate, which controls chewing,
swallowing and which controls sleeping and waking. We have a more highly
developed brain which is uniquely human which controls our relation to the
outside world, our capacity to talk, to see, to feel, to sing, to think. Brain
death necessarily must mean the death of both of these functions of the
brain, vegetative and the sapient. Therefore, the presence of any function
which is regulated or governed or controlled by the deeper parts of the brain
which in laymen's terms might be considered purely vegetative would mean
that the brain is not biologically dead.
Quinlan at 24, 355 A.2d at 654-655.
45. Id. at 23, 355 A.2d at 654.
46. Id. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
47. In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801, 824 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1975), (1975) modified, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
48. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
49. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. In regard to Karen's father acting as her
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The court held that the only practical way to prevent destruction of

Ms. Quinlan's right to deny herself medical care was to have someone
exercise the right for her. 50 In this case, the court determined that
Ms. Quinlan's father was the proper individual to make the decision
for her."
Developing out of this case, the "Principle of Substituted Judgment" establishes that a person may "step in" and make a decision

regarding the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment from an

incompetent person.5 2 The decision-maker's goal should be to effec-

tuate what the incompetent would want if the incompetent was able

to make the decision." The Principle of Substituted Judgment has
been extensively followed5 4 and is the recommended standard as
advanced by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (hereinafter President's Commission) in its March, 1983 Report.55
The court established a procedure by which future incompetent
individuals similarly situated in a hospital could be removed from
guardian in exercising her right to withdraw from artificial life support, the court
stated:
If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive, vegetative
existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident
of her right of privacy, as we believe it to be, then it should not be discarded
solely on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the
choice. The only practical way to prevent destruction of the right is to
permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment,
subject to the qualifications hereinafter stated, as to whether she would
exercise it in these circumstances. If their conclusion is in the affirmative
this decision should be accepted by a society the overwhelming majority of
whose members would, we think, in similar circumstances, exercise such a
choice in the same way for themselves or for those closest to them. It is for
this reason that we determine that Karen's right of privacy may be asserted.
in her behalf, in this respect, by her guardian and family under the particular
circumstances presented by this record.
Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 415, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (1987).
53. Id. at 415, 529 A.2d at 444-45.

54. See, e.g., In re Prange, 166 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 520 N.E.2d 946 (1988); In
re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,
398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp.,
602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985); John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d
921, (Fla. 1984); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
55. President's Commission, supra note 2, at 136.
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life-sustaining medical procedures.5 6 First, the guardian and family of
the patient decide that life-support should be terminated.5 7 Then the

patient's attending physicians must conclude that there is no reasonable possibility of the patient ever emerging from his present comatose
condition.5 8 Additionally, the guardian should consult with the hospital "Ethics Committee" 5 9 regarding the decision. 60 If the Ethics
Committee agrees with the physicians, then the life-support may be
61

terminated.
The court expressly stated that judicial intervention was not

necessarily required for the implementation of comparable decisions

in the field of medical practice. 62 This indicated that the court did not
feel that cases similar to Quinlan need be resolved in a court of law.
This left open the question as to just how dissimilar a case had to be
from Quinlan before it would be necessary to seek judicial intervention.
B. INCOMPETENT/CHRONICALLY ILL/NURSING HOME SETTING: IN RE
CONRO y63

In 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court had the opportunity once

again to address the issue of an incompetent patient's right regarding
withdrawal from life-sustaining procedures in the case of In re Conroy.64 Conroy centered around a guardian's attempt to have his 84year-old ward withdrawn from life-sustaining treatment consisting of
a nasogastric tube65 that provided sustenance and hydration.6 The
56. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54, 355 A.2d 647, 671, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. An "Ethics Committee" consists of physicians, social workers, attorneys,
and theologians. This committee assists individuals faced with ethical decisions by
acting as an advisory body rather than an enforcement body. Id. at 49, 355 A.2d at
668. See generally President's Commission, supra note 2, at 160-65.
60. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
61. Id. The court also specifically held that such action would be without any
civil or criminal liability on the part of any participant. Id.
62. Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 672.
63. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
64. Id.

65. A nasogastric tube is a tube that is presented through a patient's nose and
into the patient's stomach to provide sustenance and hydration. INTER.ATIoNA,
DIcTIoNARY OF MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY 1875 (1986). One important distinction
between Conroy and Quinlan is the type of artificial life support intervention that
was employed. In Quinlan, the patient was attached to a mechanical respirator that
assisted her ventilation. Presumably if she was removed from the respirator her
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6
ward, Claire Conroy, was seriously ill67 and lived in a nursing home. 1
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding
that in proper circumstances a guardian could69terminate a chronically
ill patient's life-sustaining medical treatment.

breathing would cease, which in turn would stop her heart and she would die within
a very few minutes. In Conroy it was estimated that if her nasogastric tube was
removed, death from dehydration would follow in approximately one week. 98 N.J.
at 338, 486 A.2d at 1217. There was also evidence that this would be a painful death.
Id. The court dispensed with this concern by adopting the viewpoint that artificial
feeding and hydration are forms of medical treatment, and that these treatments
should be viewed the same as artificial ventilation, i.e., a patient has the right to
withdraw from such treatment and a guardian may have the treatment withdrawn
from his or her ward. Id. at 374, 486 A.2d at 1236-37.
66. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 336, 486 A.2d at 1216.
67. Ms. Conroy had, by the time of the appeal to the supreme court, died with
the nasogastric tube still in place. The supreme court agreed to decide the case on
the merits since it was a substantial issue capable of repetition yet evading review. 98
N.J. at 342, 486 A.2d at 1219. At the time of trial, Ms. Conroy was in the following
condition:
Ms. Conroy was no longer ambulatory and was confined to bed, unable to
move from a semi-fetal position. She suffered from arteriosclerotic heart
disease, hypertension, and diabetes mellitus; her left leg was gangrenous to
her knee; she had several necrotic decubitus ulcers (bed sores) on her left
foot, leg, and hip; an eye problem required irrigation; she had a urinary
catheter in place and could not control her bowels; she could not speak;
and her ability to swallow was very limited. On the other hand, she interacted
with her environment in some limited ways: she could move her head, neck,
hands, and arms to a minor extent; she was able to scratch herself, and had
pulled at her bandages, tube, and catheter; she moaned occasionally when
moved or fed through the tube, or when her bandages were changed; her
eyes sometimes followed individuals in the room; her facial expressions were
different when she was awake from when she was asleep; and she smiled on
occasion when her hair was combed, or when she received a comforting
rub.
98 N.J. at 337, 486 A.2d at 1217. It is important to note that Claire Conroy was not
in a persistent vegetative state like Karen Quinlan.
68. The court cited five concerns regarding nursing home patients:
1. Residents of nursing homes are a particularly vulnerable population.
2. Nursing-home residents are often without surviving family.
3. Physicians play a much more limited role in nursing homes than in
hospitals.
4. Nursing homes as institutions suffer from peculiar industry-wide problems to which hospitals are less prone.
5. Nursing homes generally are not faced with the need to make decisions
about a patient's medical care with the same speed that is necessary in
hospitals.
98 N.J. at 375-77, 486 A.2d at 1237-38.
69. Id. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231.
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In arriving at its decision, the supreme court developed three
different tests: the Subjective Test, 70 the Limited Objective Test, 71 and
the Pure Objective Test. 72 The purpose of these tests is to assist the
guardian in assessing what a previously competent individual who has
been rendered incompetent by injury or disease would want in regard
to his life-sustaining treatment. 73 Whether a patient meets the criteria
for one of these tests determines whether his life-sustaining medical
treatment will be terminated. 74 One commentator has described the
three tests in the following way:
1. Subjective Test
If the formerly competent patient's wishes can be clearly
ascertained, for example by durable power of attorney (powers
that remain in effect after the individual has become incompetent) or in a written "living will" or a clear oral declaration
to a family member or health care provider, those patient
choices are given priority in decision making. The goal is to
understand what decision the patient would have made if he
or she had been competent. This test requires that the incompetent patient's surrogate decision maker be given as much
medical information as would be expected to have been given
to the patient if he or she had been competent to consent to
75
or reject treatment.
2.

Limited Objective Test

If the patient's wishes cannot be clearly ascertained, the
court identified two "best interests" tests. Under the limited
objective test, there must be some trustworthy evidence that
the patient would have refused treatment, although this evidence may not be as clear as that under the subjective test.
Evidence might include the patient's moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs, or attempts to refuse hospitalization or physicians'
care. This test requires the patient's surrogate or guardian to
be convinced that the burdens of the patient's life, continued
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

98 N.J. at 360-65,
Id. at 365-67, 486
Id. at 366-68, 486
Id. at 360-62, 486
Id. at 383-85, 486

486 A.2d at 1229-31.
A.2d at 1232.
A.2d at 1232-33.
A.2d at 1229.
A.2d at 1241-42.

75. Anderson, supra note 1, at 141.
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because of the treatment, outweigh the benefits of continued
life for the patient. This test also requires medical evidence
concerning the patient's current and future pain and suffering,
including evidence with regard to the duration, degree and
76
constancy of pain with and without treatment.
3. Pure Objective Test
The second best interests test, the pure objective test, not
only weighs the burdens versus the benefits for the patient but
also adds that continuing treatment could be construed as
inhumane because of constant, unavoidable severe pain for
the patient kept alive by the treatment. However, even in these
cases, if the patient had previously expressed the desire to be
kept alive, regardless of the pain, the court ruled that life77
sustaining treatment should not be withheld or withdrawn.
In developing the Limited Objective Test and the Pure Objective
Test, the court retreated from its position in the Quinlan case with
regard to extrinsic evidence. 78 In Quinlan, the court described Ms.
Quinlan's previous conversations with friends and family members
regarding the topic of life-sustaining medical procedures to be "without sufficient probative weight." ' 79 In Conroy the court stated "[sluch
evidence is certainly relevant to shed light on whether the patient
would have consented to the treatment if competent to make the
decision."80

Ms. Conroy did not have a living will, she had not executed a
durable power of attorney, and she had not made an oral statement
to anyone regarding her wishes with respect to life-sustaining medical
procedures,81 thus she did not meet the criteria for determination
under the Subjective Test.82 The court also indicated that the evidence
at trial was inadequate to satisfy the demands of either the Limited
Objective Test or the Pure Objective Test.83 Had Ms. Conroy lived
until the time of this decision, she would not have been withdrawn
76. Id. at 141-42.

77. Id. at 142.
78. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 362, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (1985).
79. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 335 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
992 (1976).

80. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230.
81. Id. at 385-86, 486 A.2d at 1242-43.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 386, 486 A.2d at 1243.
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from the medical procedures sustaining her existence because she did
84
not meet any of the three tests.
The court established the following guidelines to assist decisionmakers faced with the prospect of removing an elderly, incompetent
nursing-home resident from life-sustaining medical procedures:
(1) A guardian should be appointed for the incompetent
individual.
(2) The guardian must apply the particular facts of his ward's
situation to the three tests previously discussed to ascertain if
his ward meets the criteria of one of the tests.
(3) The guardian who believes that withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment would effectuate his ward's wishes
or would be in the ward's "best interests" should notify the
Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly
(hereinafter Ombudsman) 5 of the contemplated action.
(4) The Ombudsman should treat the notification as a possible "abuse," and is required to investigate the matter and
report upon it within twenty-four hours to the Commissioner
of Human Services and to any other government agency that
regulates or operates the facility.
(5) Evidence concerning the patient's condition should be
provided by his attending physician and nurses and two independent physicians should then be appointed to confirm the
patient's medical condition and prognosis.
(6)Provided that the two physicians supply the necessary
medical foundation, the guardian, with the concurrence of the
attending physician, may withhold or withdraw treatment if
he believes in good faith, based on the medical evidence and
any evidence of the patient's wishes, that it is clear that one
of the three tests is satisfied. The Ombudsman must also
concur in the decision. If the Limited Objective or the Pure
Objective Test is being used, the patient's family (spouse,
parents, and children, or, in their absence, the patient's next
84. Id.
85. For information regarding purpose and duties of the Ombudsmah, see N.J.
REv. STAT. § 52:27G-1 (1984).
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of kin, if any) must also concur in the decision to withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining treatment. In the absence of bad

faith, those who are decision-makers under this procedure are
86
not subject to civil or criminal liability.
C.

RECENT CASES

In 1987 the Supreme Court of New Jersey rendered decisions in
three cases involving patients' rights regarding the withdrawal from
life-sustaining medical intervention. These cases significantly broadened the holdings of Quinlan and Conroy.

1. Competent/Terminally Ill/Home Setting: In re Farrell7
The first of these three cases involved a 37-year-old wife and

mother stricken with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). ss ALS causes

physical deterioration but has no ill effects on one's mental capabilities. 9 Mrs. Farrell was confined to bed, living at home, and was

connected to a mechanical respirator.90 After suffering from the
disease for just over three years and knowing that she was in the last
stages of her life, Mrs. Farrell asked her doctor to remove the

mechanical respirator from her person. 9' Her doctor fully informed

her of the consequences of such an action and arranged for her to
see a psychologist. 92 Both this psychologist and a second psychologist

is:

86. Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 379-85, 486A.2d 1209, 1239-42.
87. 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
88. Amytrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), also known as "Lou Gehrig's Disease"

[a] disorder of the nervous system that results in a degeneration of the
victim's muscles. Although it eventually renders a patient incapable of
movement, ALS does not impair the patient's mental faculties. The cause
of the disease is unknown and there is no available treatment or cure. At
the time of diagnosis, a victim's life expectancy even with life-sustaining
treatment is usually one to three years.
Id. at 344, 529 A.2d at 408.
It is important to note that Mrs. Farrell was competent to make a decision
regarding her withdrawal from life support. Patients Quinlan and Conroy were
incompetent to make such decisions, thus someone had to make the medical decisions
for them. This is one significant difference between Farrell and Quinlan and Conroy.
89. 108 N.J. at 344, 529 A.2d at 408.
90. 108 N.J. at 344-45, 529 A.2d at 408.
91. Id. at 345, 529 A.2d at 408-09.
92. Id. at 345, 529 A.2d at 409.
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opined that Mrs. Farrell was competent to make such a decision. 93
Her husband, children, parents, and sister assisted her with the
decision.9

Mr. Farrell petitioned the court to be appointed "Special Medical
Guardian" 95 for his wife with specific power to remove the respirator,
and for a declaratory judgment that neither he nor anyone who
undertook such action would be held civilly or criminally liable.96 The
trial court granted the petitioner's relief but stayed the order pending
appellate review. 97 Six days after the trial court rendered its decision,
Mrs. Farrell died, still attached to her respirator. 9

They-New Jersey Supreme Court granted direct certification,

agreerwg to hear the case and render a decision based upon the merits
because it determined this to be a substantial issue capable of repetition yet evading review.9 The supreme court affirmed the trial court
and in so doing formulated guidelines under which a competent,
terminally ill patient living at home'00 could withdraw from lifesustaining medical treatment:10'
93. Id. For a discussion of what is a "competent patient," see supra note 36.
Part of being a competent patient is not being clinically depressed or requiring
psychiatric treatment. The psychologist Mrs. Farrell had been seeing based her opinion
on the weekly discussions she had been having with Mrs. Farrell. The psychologist
testified at trial that Mrs. Farrell's decision was not the result of a mere whim or
casual decision. 108 N.J. at 346, 529 A.2d at 409.
94. 108 N.J. at 346, 529 A.2d at 409.
95. A "Special Medical Guardian" has court appointed powers regarding the
decisions he can make on behalf of a ward entrusted to his care. 108 N.J. at 345,
529 A.2d at 409.
96. Id.
97. In re Farrell, 212 N.J. Super. 294, 514 A.2d 1342 (1986), aff'd, 108 N.J.
335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
98. Farrell, 108 N.J. at 347, 529 A.2d at 410.
99. Id. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 342, 486 A.2d 1209, 1219 (1985).
100. Note the difference in where each of these patient were situated:
Quinlan involved a patient in a hospital.
Conroy involved a patient in a nursing home.
Farrell involved a patient residing at home.
Like the special considerations of a patient residing in a nursing home, (See Conroy,
98 N.J. at 375-77, 486 A.2d at 1237-38), a patient living at home also has need for
special considerations. Farrell, 108 N.J. at 356, 529 A.2d at 414-15.
101. Farrell, 108 N.J. at 354, 529 A.2d at 413. A very significant part of those
guidelines includes a "balancing test" that the court must undertake to ensure that
the individual's right to withdraw or refuse life-sustaining medical intervention is not
outweighed by a countervailing state interest. The court identified four of these
interests: (1) preserving life, (2) preventing suicide, (3) safeguarding the integrity of
the medical profession and (4) protecting innocent third parties. Id. at 349-50, 529

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

(1) It must first be determined that the patient is competent
and has been properly informed about his prognosis, the
alternative treatments available, and the risk involved in withdrawal of the life-sustaining treatment.
(2) It must be determined that the patient made his choice
voluntarily.
(3) The patient's right to choose to withdraw from
sustaining medical treatment must be balanced against the
potentially countervailing state interests: preserving life,
venting suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical
fession, and protecting innocent parties.

lifefour
prepro-

(4) In order to protect the patient residing at home, two nonattending physicians must examine the patient to confirm that
he is competent and is fully informed about his prognosis, the
medical alternatives available, the risks involved, and the likely
outcome if medical treatment is disconnected. The court also
stated that no civil or criminal liability will be incurred by any
person who, in good faith reliance upon these guidelines,
withdraws life-sustaining treatment at the request of an informed and competent patient who has undergone the required
independent (two physician) medical examination.10 2
2. Incompetent/Persistent Vegetative State/Nursing Home Setting:
03
In re Jobes
The second of the three cases involved a 31-year-old woman,
Nancy Ellen Jobes, who was adjudicated to be in a persistent vegeA.2d at 411. See, e.g., In re Prange, 166 Il1. App. 3d 1091, 520 N.E.2d 946 (1988);
In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1988); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154
Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209
Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980);
In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Commissioner of Correction v.
Meyers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979); Saikewicz v. Superintendent of
Belchertown State School, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
102. Farrell, 108 N.J. at 353-59, 529 A.2d at 413-16.
103. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
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tative state. 1° Mrs. Jobes was a resident in a nursing home and was
being sustained through the use of a j-tube 0 Mrs. Jobes had been
in a persistent vegetative state and a resident at the nursing home for
five years when, in 1985, her husband and parents requested that the
j-tube be withdrawn.10 The nursing home refused and Mr. Jobes, as
Mrs. Jobes' guardian, petitioned the trial court to "authorize and
order" the removal of the j-tube. 0 7 Mr. Jobes asserted that his wife
was in a persistent vegetative state with no prospect of improvement,
and that if competent, she would want to be disconnected from the
j-tube. 10 8 The trial court found in Mr. Jobes' favor, holding that he
had proven his assertions with "clear and convincing" evidence.' °9
The court authorized Mr. Jobes to remove the j-tube under the
supervision of a licensed physician." 0 The court also held that the
nursing home was not required to participate in the removal of the jtube and that it could keep Mrs. Jobes connected to it until she was
transferred out of that facility."' Both parties appealed and direct
certification was granted by the New Jersey Supreme Court." ' 2
The supreme court affirmed with modification the decision reached
by the trial court." 3 The court concluded that there was "clear and
convincing" evidence (as required in Conroy) that Mrs. Jobes was in
a persistent vegetative state." 4 The court did not find, however, that
there was clear and convincing evidence with regard to what Mrs.
Jobes' decision would be concerning the continuance of life-sustaining
procedures under the Conroy subjective test." 5 Since there was "trustworthy evidence that supported Mrs. Jobes' personal inclinations,"
the court did not disturb the finding of the trial court." 6 The court
indicated the necessity to look to Quinlan for guidance for the
104. Id. at 400, 529 A.2d at 437.
105. A "j-tube" is a tube inserted into the jejunum of the small intestine that
provides an incapacitated individual with artificial sustenance and hydration. Id. at
400, 529 A.2d at 437.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 400-01, 529 A.2d at 437.
112. In re Jobes, 105 N.J. 532, 523 A.2d 173 (1986), aff'd, 108 N.J. 394, 529
A.2d 434 (1987).
113. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 428, 529 A.2d 434, 452 (1987).
114. Id. at 408, 529 A.2d at 441.
115. Id. at 412-13, 529 A.2d at 443.
116. Id. at 419-20, 529 A.2d at 447.
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implementation of the Principle of Substituted Judgment." The court
held that Mr. Jobes and Mrs. Jobes' family were the correct people
to "step in" and make the decision for Mrs. Jobes. 1 Because of the
9
special concerns that the court had expressed in previous cases," the
court once again set up special procedures for individuals who are
confined to nursing homes.1 °
In the situation where a non-elderly,' 2 ' non-hospitalized patient
is in a persistent vegetative state, the following guidelines were established by the court:

(1) The right of a patient in a persistent vegetative state to
withdraw from life-sustaining medical treatment may be exercised by the patient's family or close friend. If a family
member or friend is willing to make this decision, there is no
need to have a guardian appointed. The only requirement is
that the decision-maker comply with these guidelines. If no
family members or friends exist and there is nothing left by
the patient to indicate who should undertake decision-making
responsibilities, then a guardian must be appointed.
(2) The decision-maker who declines life-sustaining medical
treatment must secure statements from at least two independent physicians knowledgeable in neurology that the patient is
in a persistent vegetative state and that there is no reasonable
possibility that the patient will ever recover to a cognitive
state. The patient's attending physician must also submit a
statement regarding the patient's condition and prognosis.
(3) If there is a dispute among the family members or friends
of the patient, or between the attending physician and the
independent physicians, then any interested party can invoke
judicial aid to insure that the guidelines established are followed properly and that the patient is protected.
117. Id. at 421, 529 A.2d at 448. For a general discussion regarding the Principle
Judgment see President's Commission supra note 2, at 132-36.
Substituted
of
118. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 420, 529 A.2d at 447.
119. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 374-77, 486 A.2d 1209, 1237-38
(1985); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 382-84, 529 A.2d 419, 428-29 (1987). See also supra
note 68.
120. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 421, 529 A.2d 434, 448 (1987).
121. As a non-elderly (under the age of 60 years) individual, Mrs. Jobes was
not subject to the authority of the Ombudsman. Id. at 422, 529 A.2d at 448.

1988:427]

LIVING WILLS

(4) If the independent physicians' reports indicate that the
patient is in a persistent vegetative state and that there is no
reasonable possibility that the patient will ever recover to a
functional, cognitive state, and all the family members, friends
and the attending physician are in agreement, the life-sustaining medical treatment may be disconnected. As in all of these
cases, no criminal or civil liability will attach to those participants in the decision-making process as long as the guidelines
were followed in good faith.122
3. Incompetent/Persistent Vegetative State/Nursing Home Setting:
123
In re Peter
The last of the three cases involved a 65 year old nursing home
resident, Hilda Peter, who was in a persistent vegetative state with no
hope of recovery.'2 Ms. Peter was being kept alive by a nasogastric
tube that provided her sustenance and hydration. 25 Prior to Ms.
Peter's incapacitation in 1984, she had executed a durable power of
attorney specifically authorizing her friend, Eberhard Johanning, to
make all medical decisions for her in the event she was rendered
incompetent. 26 In 1985, Ms. Peter was declared incompetent and per
his request, Mr. Johanning was declared her guardian.' 27 He was
specifically told that before he could authorize the withholding or
withdrawal of life support, he needed to obtain the approval of the
State of New Jersey, Office of the Ombudsman for the Institution28
alized Elderly.
Mr. Johanning wrote to the Ombudsman requesting authorization
to have the nasogastric tube removed from Ms. Peter. 29 The Ombudsman investigated the situation and concluded, "Hilda Peter
would not have wanted to be kept alive by mechanical means in a
persistent vegetative state."'3 0 The Ombudsman, however, also concluded that the ruling in Conroy prevented him from consenting to
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 420-26, 529 A.2d at 447-50.
108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
Id. at 370, 529 A.2d at 422.
Id.
Id. at 370-71, 529 A.2d at 422.
Id. at 371, 529 A.2d at 422.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the removal of the nasogastric tube.' 3' The New Jersey Supreme Court
1 32
granted direct certification.
The court held that the Conroy subjective test is applicable to
every guardian-refusal-of-treatment case. 3' The court also held that
the durable power of attorney executed by Ms. Peter and the multiple
reliable hearsay accounts of her disdain for artificial life support
Ms. Peter would
established "clear and convincing" evidence that
34
life-support.
from
withdrawn
be
to
wanted
have
The guidelines established by the court to assist future decisionmakers when an elderly nursing home patient in a persistent vegetative
state is to be withdrawn from life-sustaining medical procedures
include:
(1) A family member should make the decision. Unless the
patient has specifically designated a close friend as the decision-maker, the court requires that a guardian be appointed.
Where the patient has no family members or friends, a guardian must be appointed.
(2) If the patient leaves clear and convincing evidence of his
feelings regarding life-sustaining treatment, the Subjective Test
developed in Conroy should be used. If a patient does not
leave clear and convincing evidence regarding his feelings
about life-sustaining treatment, the Limited Objective and
Pure Objective Tests developed in Conroy are not used. Instead, the Principle of Substituted Judgment as developed in
Quinlan and elaborated upon in Jobes is utilized. 33
(3) The surrogate decision-maker who believes that withholding or withdrawing life-support would effectuate the patient's
wishes should notify the Ombudsman regarding the contemplated action.
(4) The Ombudsman should treat the notification as a possible "abuse" and is required to investigate the matter and
report upon it within twenty-four hours to the Commissioner
of Human Services and to any other government agency that
regulates or operates the facility.
131. Id. at 372, 529 A.2d at 422.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.

Id. at 385, 529 A.2d at 429.
Id. at 379, 529 A.2d at 426-27.
Id. at 385, 529 A.2d at 429.
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(5) Evidence concerning the patient's condition should be
provided by his attending physician and nurse. Two or more
independent physicians should than be appointed to confirm
the patient's medical condition and prognosis.
(6) Provided that the two physicians supply the necessary
medical foundation, the decision-maker, with the concurrence
of the attending physician, may withhold or withdraw treatment if he believes that this is what the patient would want
done if he was competent to make the decision. The Ombudsman must also concur in the decision. In the absence of bad
faith, those who take part in this procedure are not subject to
civil or criminal liability.' 16
D.

A SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT NEW JERSEY LAW

The overall effect of the guidelines set forth in these cases has
been to assure most patients, whether competent or incompetent, their
right to make choices regarding their medical care, including the
withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining medical intervention.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has indicated that the judicial forum
is not the optimal place that decisions regarding life support are to
be made. 37 The court recognizes that this is an intensely personal
decision that is best left to the individual, his designated representative, or family, depending upon the circumstances of each situation. 3 '
To enable these proper individuals to make such decisions so as to
avoid criminal and/or civil liability, and to avoid undue interference
from the state or others, the court has attempted to make clear its
intentions as to what the law should be until, or if, there is legislative
action. 39
The New Jersey case law distinguishes between competent and
incompetent patients. Generally, a competent, fully-informed hospital
136. See guidelines developed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 379-80, 486 A.2d 1209, 1239-40 (1985).
137. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 422-23, 529 A.2d 434, 448-449 (1987);
In re Farrell 108 N.J. 335, 357, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 344-46, 486 A.2d at 1209, 1220-21 (1985).
138. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 420, 529 A.2d 434, 447 (1987); In re
Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 484-85, 529 A.2d 419, 429-30 (1987); In re Farrell, 108 N.J.
335, 355-58, 529 A.2d 404, 413-15 (1987).
139. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 419, 529 A.2d 434, 447 (1987); In re
Peters, 108 N.J. 365, 384-85, 529 A.2d 419, 429-30 (1987); In re Farrell, 108 N.J.
335, 354-56, 529 A.2d 404, 413, 415 (1987).
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patient has the right to refuse or stop life-sustaining treatment. ' ° It
must be determined that the patient's choice is voluntary.' 4' The
patient's choice must also be weighed against the four countervailing
state interests,' 4 2 but generally a patient's "interest in freedom from
nonconsensual invasion of her bodily integrity would outweigh any
43
state interest."
In order to assure that the patient is competent, fully informed
and acting voluntarily, the court has held that two independent, nonattending physicians must examine the patient when the patient is
residing at home.'" Given the less stringently controlled environment
of a nursing home, 45 the court would probably require the same
procedure for a competent patient in a nursing home or other institution, although this issue has not yet been addressed by the court.'4
Incompetent patients do not lose their rights through incompetency. ' 7 The central issues in these cases usually involve two factors:
Who can make medical decisions on behalf of the patient and what
criteria should used to make those decisions?
The four cases decided by the court involving incompetent patients' rights have contained four different combinations of factors.
Quinlan involved a non-elderly patient in a persistent vegitative state
residing in a hospital; Conroy involved an elderly, chronically ill
patient residing in a nursing home; Peter involved an elderly patient
in a persistent vegetative state residing in a nursing home; and Jobes
involved a non-elderly patient in a persistent vegetative state residing
in a nursing home.
Generally, the Subjective Test, 148 as developed by the court in
Conroy is applicable to all cases where a decision-maker is attempting
to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a patient. 49 A

140. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 358, 529 A.2d 404, 416 (1987).

141. Id. at 357, 529 A.2d at 413.
142. Id. at 354, 529 A.2d at 413.
143. Id. at 358, 529 A.2d at 413, quoting In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 355, 486
A.2d 1209, 1226 (1985).
144. Id. at 360, 529 A.2d at 414-15.
145. For special considerations with regard to nursing homes, see supra note 69.
146. The three cases involving patients in nursing homes, Conroy, Jobes, and
Peter, have only addressed issues related to incompetent patients.
147. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
148. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
149. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 377, 529 A.2d 419, 429 (1987).
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patient who meets the criteria of the Subjective Test will usually have
his choice honored regarding life-sustaining treatment. 50
Incompetent terminally or chronically ill patients who do not
meet the Subjective Test criteria are scrutinized using the Limited
Objective 5 ' and Pure Objective12 Tests. If no basis can be found to
withhold or withdraw treatment from these individuals through the
application of these three tests, the patient will not have treatment
withheld or withdrawn.'
Incompetent patients in a persistent vegetative state (i.e. accident
victims) who do not meet the Subjective Test criteria are not subjected
56
to analysis under the Limited Objective"54 and Pure Objective'" Tests.1
Instead these patients' family, friends, or in the absence of any family
or friends, a guardian, are entrusted with decision-making power.."'
This is the Principle of Substituted Judgment as developed in Quinlan
and expanded upon in Jobes. The goal of the decision maker is to
make the decision regarding life-sustaining treatment just as the
58
patient would, if he were competent.
In any case regarding an incompetent, once a decision regarding
what the patient wanted or would have wanted is made, the decision
must be reviewed.' 59 In a hospital, an Ethics Committee reviews the
decision.' 60 In a nursing home or similar institution, two independent
physicians review the decision.' 6' In a case where the patient is sixty
years old or older, and in a nursing home or similar institution, the
Ombudsman reviews the decision. 62 These are the "checks" built into
the system to protect against "decisions that make death too easy and
63
quick as well as those that make it too agonizing and prolonged."'
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 386, 486 A.2d 1209, 1243 (1985).
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 385, 529 A.2d 419, 429 (1987).

157. Id.

158. President's Commission, supra note 2, at 132-34.
159. See, e.g., In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 385, 529 A.2d 419, 429 (1987); In re
Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 421-22, 529 A.2d 434, 448 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,
383-84, 486 A.2d 1209, 1241-42 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 55, 355 A.2d 647,
671-72, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
160. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
161. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 422, 529 A.2d at 448.
162. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 383-84, 496 A.2d at 1241-42.
163. President's Commission, supra note 2, at 23.
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How THE ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE AND COURTS HAVE ADDRESSED
THE PROBLEM: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS.

THE ILLINOIS LEGISLATURES'S RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM: THE
ILLINOIS LIVING WILL ACT

Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted
statutes addressing a patient's right to control his medical treatment
with respect to life-sustaining procedures.'6 In 1983 the Illinois Leg164. See Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE

Act Relating to the Rights of the Terminally Ill,

§ 22-8A-1-10 (1981); Alaska

ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.01-1-.100
(1986); Arizona Medical Treatment Decision, Auz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201-§ 363201 (1985); Arkansas Death with Dignity, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801-§ 82-3804
(1977); California Natural Death Act, Cal. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195
(1976); Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-113;
see also CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12-36-117 (1985); Connecticut Death with Dignity Act,
Public Act No. 85-606 (1985); Delaware Death with Dignity Act, DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1982); District of Columbia Natural Death Act of 1981, D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-2421-§ 6-2430 (1982); Florida Life Prolonging Procedure Act, FLA.

§ 765.01-§ 765.15 (1984); Georgia Living Wills Act, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 31-32-1-§ 31-32-12 (1984); Hawaii Act, 1986 Hawaii Sess. Laws 338 (1986); Idaho

STAT. ANN.,

Natural Death Act, IDAHO CODE § 39-4501-§ 39-4508 (1977); Illinois Living Will Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 701-710 (1985) (amended 1987); Indiana Living
Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act, IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-1-§ 16-8-11-22

(1985); Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.1-§ 144A.11
(1985); Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101-109 (1979);
Louisiana Life-Sustaining Procedures, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10
(West 1984) (amended 1985); Maine Living Wills Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 710a (1985); Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE

ANN. § 5-601-§ 5-614, subtitle 6, Life-Sustaining Procedures (1985); Mississippi Nat-

§ 41-41-101-§ 41-41-121 (1984); Missouri Death§ 459.010-§ 459.055 (1985); Montana
ANN. § 50-9-101-§ 50-9-104, § 50-9-111, § 50-9-201-

ural Death Act, Miss. CODE ANN.

Prolonging Procedures Act, Mo.
Living Will Act,

MONT. CODE

REv. STAT.

§ 50-9-206 (1985); Nevada Withholding of Life-Sustaining Procedures, NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 449.540-§ 449.720 (Michie 1977); New Hampshire Living Wills Act,
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137H (1985); New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-7-1-§ 24-7-11 (1977); North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-320-§ 90-322 (1977) (amended 1979, 1981, 1983); Oklahoma Natural
Death Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (1985); Oregon Rights with Respect to
Terminal Illness, OR. REv. STAT. § 97.050-§ 97.090 (1977) (amended 1983); South
Carolina Death With Dignity Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-10-§ 44-77-160 (1986);
Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act, TENN. CODE. ANN. § 32-11-101-§ 32-11-111
(1983); Texas Natural Death Act, TEx. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4590h, (1977) (amended
1979, 1983, 1985); Utah Personal Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 75-2-1101-§ 75-2-1118 (1985); Vermont Terminal Care Document, VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 and tit. 13, § 1801 (1982); Virginia Natural Death Act, VA.
CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:1-§ 54-325.8:13 (1983); Washington Natural Death Act, WASH.
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islature enacted the Illinois Living Will Act (hereinafter Act).' 65 The
Act was signed into law and took effect January 1, 1984. Substantial
changes were made to the Act in 1987.'6 The following discussion
will demonstrate that while the Illinois Legislature has taken a step in
the right direction, the Act is not a comprehensive solution to all
problems in this area.
The purposes of the Act are as follows: to establish that the
Illinois Legislature recognizes that individuals have the right to control
decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, including
the decision to have death-delaying procedures withheld or withdrawn
in the instance of a "terminal condition"; 67 to establish a means
whereby persons can acquire this right;' 61 to place limitations upon
exercise of the right; 169 and to provide a means to ensure others'
recognition and respect of the right. 70
In an attempt to eliminate existing ambiguities, certain changes
were made to the Act in 1987.17l One change included the substitution
of the term "life-sustaining" with the term "death-delaying."' ' 72 A
second change was the specific limitations placed upon death-delaying
procedures. 73 The Act now explicitly prohibits the withholding or
withdrawal of artificial hydration or nutrition treatment in cases where
death will result solely from dehydration or starvation. 74 Under the
original version of the Act, life-sustaining procedure was only defined;
no specific procedures were described and no limitations were placed
upon these procedures. 75
REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.010-§ 70.122.905 (1979); West Virginia Natural Death Act,
W. VA. CODE § 16-30-1-§ 16-30-10 (1984); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, Wisc. STAT.

§ 154.01-§ 154.15 (West 1984); Wyoming Living Will Act, Wyo. STAT. § 3522-101-§ 35-22-109 (1984).
165. ILL. RIEv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 701-10 (1985) (amended 1987).
166. 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 366 (West) (Public Act 85-189); 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv.
990 (West) (Public Act 85-860).
167. IlRev. Stat. ch. 110 1/2, para. 701 (1985) (amended 1987).
168. Id. For specific directions on how to execute a document see para. 703.
169. See para. 702. For the changes made to this paragraph see 1987 Ill. Legis.
Serv. 990-91 (West) (Public Act 85-860).
170. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 706-08 (1985) (amended 1987). For the
changes made to these paragraphs see 1987 Il.Legis. Serv. 990, 993-95 (West) (Public
Act 85-860).
171. See supra note 166.
172. See 1987 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 990 (West) (Public Act 85-860).
173. Id. at 991-92.
174. Id. at 990.
175. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(c) (1985) (amended 1987). The only
stipulation regarding limitations placed upon life-sustaining procedures was that a
ANN..

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

The 1987 changes also provided penalties for a physician who
fails to honor a patient's living will. 76 The original version of the Act
provided that a physician who willfully concealed a patient's living
will was civilly liable, but there was no provision that indicated that
by failing to honor a patient's living will the physician had breached
his duty to the patient.177 Under the 1987 amendment to paragraph
708, a physician or other health-care provider who willfully fails to
comply with a patient's living will is guilty of engaging in unethical
17
and unprofessional conduct in violation of the Medical Practice Act. 1
In addition, several particular aspects of the Act deserve emphasis. First, the rights provided by the Act are applicable only to
individuals who have executed a written declaration as required by
the Act. 79 Once an individual has executed a valid living will, he has
the right to control decisions regarding his medical treatment.8 0 The
a living will
Act makes no provisions for persons who fail to execute
8
'
defective.'
be
to
discovered
is
will
or whose living
A second aspect of the Act worth examining is the language used
to define a "terminal condition. '1 8 2 A terminal condition is defined
as "an incurable and irreversible condition which is such that death
is imminent and the application of death-delaying procedures serves
only to prolong the dying process."' 8 3 Since "imminent" is not defined
14
in the statute, the common usage of the term should be used. '
Imminent is defined as "[a]bout to occur; impending."'8 5 Some of its
synonyms are "close at hand, near, and threatening. ' ' 8
The problem with the word imminent is that it is relative to the
situation. This problem can be demonstrated through the following
life-sustaining procedure was not one that provided comfort care or alleviated pain.

Id.

176. See supra note 172 at 994.
177. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2 para. 708 (1985) (amended 1987).
178. Sie supra note 172, at 994.
179. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 701-03 (1985) (amended 1987).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See supra note 172, at 991.
183. Id. This is the amended version of ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(f)
(1985).
184. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (Unless otherwise defined,
"words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.")

185. Tim

(1980).
186.

AMERicAN

HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

THE NEW AmRIcAN ROGET'S THESAURUS

172 (1980).

353

1988:4271

LIVING WILLS

hypothetical. Suppose it is discovered that Andrew, an Illinois resident, has leukemia. Andrew is informed by his attending physician
that with chemotherapy he will live for one year. Without chemotherapy, Andrew will probably die within a month. Suppose also that
Andrew has executed a valid living will. May Andrew properly refuse
the chemotherapy treatment under the rights provided to him under
the Act?
The analysis must begin with a determination as to whether or
not Andrew is a "qualified patient" under the Act. 8 7 He does have
a living will, but does he have a "terminal condition?"'8 8 Under the
Act's definition of terminal condition it is apparent that Andrew has
an incurable and irreversible condition but is his death imminent
enough to qualify him? Is a one year life expectancy imminent enough
so that therapy, which will prolong his life until that point, may
properly be withheld? A seemingly simple question is rendered unanswerable by the inexact usage of the term imminent.
A third noteworthy aspect of the Act is the absence of an
affirmative duty upon an attending physician to inquire into the
existence of a living will.' 8 9 The burden is upon the patient to inform
the attending physician that he has a living will.190 No provision is
made for a patient who is unable to provide that information to his
physician.191
The Illinois Legislature has taken a preventative approach to the
problem of withholding or withdrawing death-delaying procedures
from patients. By enacting a living will statute the legislature has
established: (1) a right; (2) a process by which an individual may
acquire that right; (3) limitations upon that right; and (4) a means by
which that right will be protected. 92 Theoretically, if every individual
in the State of Illinois executed a valid living will, the entire problem
of withholding or withdrawing death-delaying procedures from patients would be resolved. Every person's will would be known and
187. See supra note 172, at 991. This is the amended version of ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(e) (1985).
188. See supra note 172, at 991. This is the amended version of ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(f) (1985).
189. See supra note 172 at 993. This is the amended version of ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110 1/2, para. 706 (1985).
190. See supra note 172 at 991-92. This is the amended version of ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(d) (1985).
191. See supra note 172 at 991, 993-94. This is the amended version of ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 703(d) and para. 706 (1985).
192. See supra note 172 at 991-95.
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could therefore be acted upon if he was ever placed in a position
requiring the implementation of death-delaying procedures.
However, not every individual in the State of Illinois is going to
execute such a declaration. The Act itself excludes certain individuals
from executing a living will.193 Additionally some wills might be found
to be invalid.' 94 Moreover, many people will never execute a living
will. Therefore the Illinois Legislature, or in the alternative, the Illinois
court system must address some outstanding issues.
What is to be done about individuals who never execute a living
will and are placed in a position where death-delaying medical procedures must be utilized? Who decides for these individuals whether
they should remain under death-delaying treatment? The doctor? A
family member? A hospital "Ethics Committee"? These are areas of
concern that the Act does not address. As there is an intestacy statute
for the orderly distribution of wealth of persons who die without a
will, so also must there be a statute that establishes guidelines to assist
individuals faced with decision-making regarding death-delaying treatment for family or friends.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, acting in the absence of a living
will statute, has addressed many issues regarding patients' rights visa-vis life-sustaining medical procedures. From these cases the supreme
court has established extensive guidelines with regard to making these
types of decisions - guidelines which Illinois could utilize in creating
legislation dealing with problem areas not covered by the Illinois
Living Will Act.
B. CASE LAW IN ILLINOIS: IN RE PRANGE9

The Illinois Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issues
involved in withholding or withdrawing patients from death-delaying
medical procedures. The only Illinois case involving these issues was
recently decided by an appellate court.
In re Prange involved a public guardian's attempt to have artificial nutrition and hydration withdrawn from his ward, Virginia T.
193. Individuals who are not in possession of a "sound mind," as well as minors
who have not yet achieved the status of an "emancipated person" are prevented
from executing a living will by ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 703(a) (1985)
(amended 1987).
194. Although the Illinois Legislature amended the executing requirements necessary for a living will, a will could still be found to be invalid. An example of how
this might occur is if a witness to the execution of the document is later found to
have a "stake" in the patient's death. See supra note 172 at 992. This is the amended
version of ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 703(e) (1985).
195. In re Prange, 166 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 520 N.E.2d 946 (1988).

1988:427]

LIVING WILLS

Prange. 196 Ms. Prange was a seventy-four year old nursing home
resident who had undergone a series of surgeries over the past years
to remove a brain tumor.1 97 At the hearing on the petition, four out
of five physicians testified that Ms. Prange was in a persistent
vegetative state and that she had suffered irreversible brain damage. 9
The public guardian also introduced into evidence a written memorandum signed by Ms. Prange that directed she not be maintained by
"artificial means or heroic measures" should she be rendered incompetent to make such decisions. 99 The document was not a valid living
will because it lacked the requisite number of witnesses as required
by the statute. 200 The public guardian also presented three witnesses
who testified that Ms. Prange had told them of her desire not to be
maintained through death-delaying medical procedures. 20 1 The court
disallowed "opinion" testimony by two other individuals who
"thought" Ms. Prange would not want to be maintained by death20 2
delaying medical procedures.
Prior to a decision on the petition, Ms. Prange died. 203 The trial
court dismissed the matter as moot. 20 The appellate court agreed to
render a decision on the merits, agreeing with the public guardian
that "there is a need for authoritative guidelines in this area.' '20
The appellate court held that a guardian has standing to bring a
suit to compel discontinuance of death-delaying medical procedures. 206
The court found the evidence to be clear and convincing that Ms.
Prange was in a persistent vegetative state and that she would not
have recovered from her comatose state. 207
The court held that Ms. Prange had a right to deny herself
medical care and that she did not lose this right through incompetence. 208 The court adopted the doctrine of substituted judgment and
held the public guardian was able to step in "to see that her expressions of intent with respect to such medical treatment are given
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1094,
1094,
1096,
1095,

520
520
520
520

N.E.2d
N.E.2d
N.E.2d
N.E.2d

at
at
at
at

947.
948.
949.
948.

at 1095-96, 520 N.E.2d at 948-49.
at 1094, 520 N.E.2d at 947.
at
at
at
at

1099, 520 N.E.2d at
1100, 520 N.E.2d at
1102, 520 N.E.2d at
1100-01, 520 N.E.2d

950.
951.
953.
at 951-52.
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effect. ' ' 209 .The court held that the attempted living will, along with

the verbal statements made by Ms. Prange to acquaintances "made
clear her desire to decline life-sustaining procedures in the absence of
any hope for her recovery.' '210
The court weighed this right against four countervailing state
interests: the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the
protection of innocent third parties, and safeguarding the integrity of
the medical profession. 21' The court held that Ms. Prange's interests
212
were superior to those interests of the state.

The court also adopted the view that a patient's constitutional
right to privacy includes the right to have such artificial-feeding

devices removed. 213 The court ended its decision by imploring the

Illinois Legislature to formulate a comprehensive scheme for dealing
with the problem of withholding and withdrawing death-delaying
21 4
medical procedures from patients.

In the case of In re Prange, the court held that the right to
privacy provided for in the Illinois Constitution is broad enough to

encompass a person's right to refuse medical treatment. 2 5 The court

held further that an individual does not lose that right through
incompetence and that a guardian may assert the right on behalf of
his ward. 216 Since this is the first case of its kind in Illinois, it can be
expected that other cases will follow, with new fact variations involved. Realizing this, the court concluded its holding by urging the
Illinois Legislature to develop a comprehensive scheme for addressing
problem areas involved in the area of withholding and withdrawing
217
patients from death-delaying medical procedures.

It seems, however, that the court in deciding this case gave little
deference to the clear guidance provided by the Illinois Legislature.
Although the Illinois Living Will Act was not controlling here, it is
important to note that one of the changes made to the Act in 1987
was a change to paragraph 702(d) 218 which now specifically states that
"[n]utrition and hydration shall not be withdrawn or withheld from
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 1101, 520 N.E.2d at 952.
Id.
Id. at 1102, 520 N.E.2d at 952.
Id. at 1102-04, 520 N.E.2d at 952-54.
Id. at 1101, 520 N.E.2d at 951.
Id. at 1104, 520 N.E.2d at 954.
Id. at 1100, 520 N.E.2d at 951.
Id. at 1100-01, 520 N.E.2d at 951-52.
Id. at 1104, 520 N.E.2d at 954.
See supra note 172.
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a qualified patient if the withdrawal or withholding would result in
death solely from dehydration or starvation rather from the existing
terminal condition.' '219 The legislature felt it necessary to specifically
prohibit the withholding or withdrawal of artificial feeding and hydration in patients where starvation or dehydration would be the sole
cause of death in living will situations. 220 A strong argument exists
that the legislature would not approve of that type of Withdrawal of
treatment from a case as the one at bar.
On the other hand, since the court based its decision on a
constitutional right of privacy, are there not implications that a limit
regarding what type of treatment may be withheld or withdrawn under
a living will statute might be unconstitutional? A patient who has a
valid living will, becomes incompetent, and is provided death-delaying
treatment by means of artificial hydration and sustenance might be
able to successfully challenge the statutory limitations of the Act as
violative of his right to privacy.
Prange is important because it signals this problem and others
for future litigation. It is not unreasonable to expect more litigation
like Prange with different factors and settings, as experienced by the
New Jersey judicial system.
To minimize the potential litigation, to promote a fair and
uniform system, and to expedite the resolution of conflicts before the
patient dies, the Illinois Legislature should revise the Living Will Act
and develop a comprehensive scheme for dealing with this problem
area.
V.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: A SUGGESTED COuRsE OF
ACTION FOR ILLINOIS

Illinois has taken a major step forward in the area of patients'
rights with the enactment of the Illinois Living Will Act. However,

the Illinois Legislature needs to realize that while this is certainly a
step in the right direction, much work must yet be done to assure all
Illinois citizens of their right to control their medical care, including
the right to forego or withdraw from death-delaying medical procedures. Part of that work entails correcting some problems with the
current Act, 22' while other work involves the creation of new legislation that will address areas of concern not covered under the Act.
This is necessary to ensure that all patients in Illinois are free to
219. Id. at 991.
220. Id.
221. See infra notes 229-46 and accompanying text.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

exercise their right to control their medical care with respect to deathdelaying medical procedures.
A.

RECOMMENDED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO THE ILLINOIS LIVING
WILL ACT

Overall, the Illinois Living Will Act is a very effective piece of
legislation. The purpose of the Act is clear and the majority of its
definitions are straightforward. The manner in which an individual
acquires rights under the Act, by executing a written declaration, is
clearly enunciated. 222 There is even a sample declaration form from
which individuals might pattern their own living will.223 The legislature
decided to make the living will easily revocable and the three methods
of revocation are unambiguously set out in Section 5.224 The sections
entitled Physician Responsibilities, Immunity, and Penalties are concise and easily understood, as are the general provisions listed under
Section 9.225
The 1987 changes to the Act emphasized making ambiguous areas
of the Act more definite. One change that should make the Act more
accessible to laypersons is the change in Section 3 regarding the
execution of the living will. 226 The original version of the Act required
the will to be "executed with the same formalities as required of a
valid will pursuant to the Probate Act of 1975."227 This requirement
has been deleted and replaced with the new requirement that the
declaration "be signed by the declarant, or another at the declarant's
'22
direction, and witnessed by 2 individuals 18 years of age or older.
Three aspects of the Act should be modified so as to improve
the clarity and operation of the Act. The first problem area that needs
modification is textual and refers to the use of the word "imminent"
in the definition of the term "terminal condition." 229 As the hypothetical regarding Andrew in Section III pointed out, the word "im230
minent" is too ambiguous.
A better way to approach the problem of deciding when a patient
may withdraw from death-delaying medical procedures is to use a
countervailing state interest approach. 21 Under this approach the
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See supra note 172 at 990.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 993.
Id. at 993-95.
Id. at 991.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 703(b) (1985) (amended 1987).
See supra note 172 at 991.

Id.

Supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
Supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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decision-maker or, if needed, a court, has the opportunity to utilize
several factors in the analysis rather than the single imminent factor
as currently employed in the Act. Various courts have identified four
countervailing state interests: 1) the preservation of life; 2) the prevention of suicide; 3) the protection of innocent third parties; and 4)
safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession.232 The Court
undertakes a balancing test, weighing the individual's right to privacy
and self-determination against the interests of the state. 23 a
Under this analysis, the answers to several questions would assist
the decision-maker or court in determining whether Andrew could
refuse treatment. How intrusive will the chemotherapy be to Andrew's
life? What will be the quality of his life while undergoing such
treatment? How will Andrew's earlier death without treatment affect
his family? What does the medical community think about Andrew's
decision? Generally, a competent informed patient's "interest in
freedom from nonconsensual invasion of her bodily integrity would

outweigh any state interest.'

'234

A second problem is that nowhere in the Act is an affirmative
duty placed upon a physician once he has determined that an individual has a terminal disease, to inquire whether the patient has a living
will. 23" A patient is responsible, if able, to inform his attending
physician that he has a living will.2 36 No provision is made regarding
an individual who is incapacitated and unable to inform his physician
that he has made a living will. 237 There should be a duty placed upon
the physician to inquire into the existence of a living will.
While shifting the duty to the physician does present certain
difficulties, the cost of resolving these difficulties is markedly outweighed by the benefit to the public. When a patient is diagnosed as
being in a terminal condition, there will be a great deal of stress
placed upon the patient's family. Where the patient himself is unable
to advise the physician of the existence of a living will, the physician,
as the professional involved in the situation, should be required to
make a reasonable inquiry into the existence of a living will. By
reasonable inquiry, one would expect a physician to ask a competent
family member or friend of the possible existence of such a document.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 354, 529 A.2d 404, 413 (1987), quoting In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 355, 486 A.2d 1209, 1226 (1985).
235. See supra note 172 at 993.
236. Id. at 991.
237. Id. at 991, 993.
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One would expect the physician to request the family member or
friend to make an inquiry of the patient's attorney regarding knowledge of such a document. If the physician can discover a patient's
living will, this should reduce the burden on the family and relieve
them of having to make such a difficult decision.
The third problem was not a problem until the 1987 changes
were made. The original version of the Act did not mention specific
death-delaying procedures.2 38 The current version of the Act explicitly
prohibits the withholding or withdrawal of artificial hydration or
nutrition treatments in cases where death will result solely from
dehydration or starvation. 23 9 While the prospect of a patient dying as
a result of starvation or dehydration is not a pleasant thought, by
amending the Act to prohibit the withholding or withdrawal of
artificial nutrition and hydration the legislature has taken a giant step
backwards in light of what the medical and legal communities have
been saying.m
Artificial hydration and nutrition are medical procedures with
inherent risks and possible side effects. 241 These procedures are analogous to kidney dialysis or mechanical ventilation in the sense that
all these procedures are mechanical, artificial treatments that prolong
242
an individual's life by performing a vital bodily function for them.
To terminate a patient's artificial nutrition or hydration treatment is
equivalent to terminating a patient's dialysis treatment or his mechanical ventilation.32 No objective distinction can be sustained between
244
the discontinuation of various treatments.

238.
239.
240.
re Grant,

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(c) (1985) (amended 1987).
See supra note 172 at 993.
See, e.g., In re Prange, 166 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 520 N.E.2d 946 (1988); In
109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1988); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz.

207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); In re Peter, 108
N.J. 365, 381, 529 A.2d 419, 427 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209

(1985); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986);

Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). In

regard to medical policy-makers, see Opinion of the American Medical Association
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (March 15, 1986), President's Commission,
supra note 2, at 3, 190, 288, Los Angeles County Medical and Bar Associations,
Principles and Guidelines Concerning the Foregoing of Life-Sustaining Treatment for
Adult Patients, (Jan. 6, 1986); Medical Society of Milwaukee County, Withdrawal
of Nutrition and Hydration in Terminal Adult Patients (1985).
241. In re Peter, 108 N.J. at 381, 529 A.2d at 427.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 382, 529 A.2d at 428 (1987).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that "[a] competent
patient has the right to decline any medical treatment, including
artificial feeding, and should retain that right when and if he becomes
incompetent.'"24 In light of the nebulous distinction between withdrawal of various treatments, this holding makes sense. An individual
can certainly write into his living will specific procedures that he does
not want withheld (i.e. artificial hydration and nutrition). 246 Why must
the legislature make this decision for him? This aspect of the Act
should be eliminated.
B.

SUGGESTIONS FOR NEW LEGISLATION

The Illinois Living Will Act will not totally alleviate problems
within the area of withholding and withdrawing individuals from
death-delaying medical procedures. 247 To assure a comprehensive system to adequately address all problems within this area, it is going to
be necessary for the Illinois Legislature to create new legislation.
This legislation should be patterned after the guidelines that have
been established by the New Jersey Supreme Court.2" The court has
developed these guidelines during its twelve year history of dealing
with cases presenting issues within the area of patients' rights vis-avis the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment. 9 The court's decisions have been widely followed, 250 and
provide a comprehensive scheme to assure most patients, whether
competent or incompetent, their right to make choices regarding their
medical care, including withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
medical intervention.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, along with other state courts,
has indicated that courts are not the proper forum for resolution of
problems within this complex area. 25' However, in the absence of
legislation, this court has stepped in and resolved issues to assure
patients' rights. The Illinois Legislature could benefit from analysis
of these decisions and the resulting guidelines. The Illinois Legislature
should heed the advice of the New Jersey Supreme Court and develop
a comprehensive scheme to deal with these complex problems. 25 2 In
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Id. at 382, 529 A.2d at 428.
Supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 140-63 and accompanying text.
Id.
See cases cited supra note 4.
See cases cited supra note 38.
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 359-65, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-31 (1985).
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the meantime, the Illinois courts should utilize the case law of New
2
Jersey to assist in resolution of problems within this area. 11
The following is a proposal for an extensive set of guidelines for
dealing with patients, both competent and incompetent, who want to
forego or withdraw from life-sustaining medical procedures. The
guidelines are a synthesis of the various New Jersey Supreme Court
decisions. It is from these guidelines that Illinois should begin its
analysis of issues relating to the problem, and from which new
legislation should be patterned.
C.

PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR NEW LEGISLATION

THE COMPETENT PATIENT:
(1) The patient must be determined to be competent 25 4 and
fully informed regarding his prognosis, alternative treatments,
and risks involved in the withdrawal of the life-sustaining
25
treatment. 1
(2) It must be determined that the patient is making his
25 6
choice voluntarily and without coercion.
(3) The patient's right to choose to withhold or withdraw
from life-sustaining intervention must be balanced against the
four countervailing state interests:
a)

Preserving Life

b)

Preventing Suicide

c)

Safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession

d)

257
Protecting innocent third parties

253. See In re Prange, 166 II1. App. 3d 1091, 520 N.E.2d 946 (1988); see also
supra notes 140-63 and accompanying text.
254. To protect the competent patient living at home, the court requires that
"two non-attending physicians examine the patient to confirm that he or she is
competent and is fully informed about his or her prognosis, the medical alternatives
available, the risks involved, and the likely outcome if medical treatment is discon-

nected." In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 357, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (1987). In note 8, the
court indicates the procedure is also applicable to patients in hospitals and nursing
homes. Id.
255. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. at 348-49, 529 A.2d at 410-11.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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Generally, a competent informed patient's "interest in freedom from
nonconsensual invasion of her bodily integrity would outweigh any
state interest.' '258
THE INCOMPETENT, INSTITUTIONALIZED, EDLERLY
PATIENT WITH SEVERE AND PERMANENT MENTAL AND
PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENTS AND A LIMITED LIFE EXPECTANCY
(1) A patient must first be declared incompetent and a guard259
ian appointed for the patient.
(2) The guardian then should "determine and effectuate,
insofar as possible, the decision that the patient would have
made if competent. ' ' 260 There are three tests to assist the
guardian with this task:
a) The Subjective Test - When it is "clear" that a person
would not want to be sustained through medical intervention, that person may be withdrawn from such life-support. 261 Such intent can be found in a living will, an oral
directive given to a family member, friend, or health care
provider, a durable power of attorney or proxy authorizing
a particular person to make medical decisions for the patient
in the event he is rendered incapable of making such decisions.2 2 Intent may also be found in hearsay evidence
elicited from witnesses who heard the patient make comments and/or express opinions about life-sustaining medical
intervention as applied to other persons. 263 The patient's
value system, religious beliefs and personality are all factors
264
to be considered in this analysis.
b) The Limited-Objective Test - When there is some, but
not enough evidence to satisfy the Subjective Test, then the
Limited-Objective Test is appropriate. 265 Under this test,
life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 381, 486 A.2d 1209, 1240 (1985).
Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
Id.
Id. at 361, 486 A.2d at 1229-30.
Id. at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230.
In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 414-15, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (1987).
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231-32.
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when "there is some trustworthy evidence that the patient
would have refused the treatment and the decision-maker is
satisfied that the burdens of the patient's continued life
with the treatment outweigh the benefits of that life for
him." " The focus here is on suffering and pain, if the
burden is high and some evidence of the subjective intent
of the patient is expressed, then the patient may be with267
drawn from life-sustaining intervention.
c) The Pure Objective Test - Where there is no trustworthy
evidence that the patient would have declined the treatment,
such treatment may be withdrawn if the burdens with the
treatment to the patient "markedly outweigh" the benefits
that the patient derives from life. 2" In effect, if the treat269
ment is "inhumane" it should be discontinued.
(3) Once the guardian has ascertained that the patient has
met one of the above tests, he should notify the Public
Guardian of the contemplated action. 270 The Public Guardian
should investigate the matter, and as part of this investigation,
have two independent physicians examine the patient. 27' Upon
agreement by both the attending doctor and the independent
doctors, the guardian may withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
272
procedures from the patient.
THE INCOMPETENT PATIENT IN A PERSISTENT VEGATATIVE STATE:
(1) A patient must first be declared incompetent and a guard273
ian appointed for the patient.
(2) There must be "clear and convincing" evidence that the
patient is in a persistent vegetative state. 27 4 In the case where
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
Id.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 383, 486 A.2d at 1241.
Id. at 384, 486 A.2d at 1242.

272. Id.

273. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 385, 529 A.2d 419, 429 (1987).
274. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 408, 529 A.2d 434, 441 (1987).
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an elderly patient is residing in a nursing home, the Public
Guardian must be contacted and he must "secure two independent medical opinions to confirm the patient's medical
condition, the medical alternatives available, the risks involved, the likely outcome if medical treatment is discontinued
and that there is no reasonable possibility of the patient's
recovery to a cognitive state.' '275 In the case of a non-elderly
patient residing in a nursing home, "the decision-maker who
declines life-sustaining medical treatment must secure statements from at least two independent physicians knowledgeable
in neurology that the patient is in a persistent vegetative state
and that there is no reasonable possibility that the patient will
ever recover to a cognitive, sapient state.' '276 In the case where
a patient is at a hospital, the decision to withdraw life Support
should be discussed by the guardian with the hospital's "Ethics
Committee. ' 277 If that body agrees that there is no reasonable
possibility of the patient emerging from the persistent vegetative state, this may be viewed as "clear and convincing"

evidence .278

(3) Where there is "clear and convincing" evidence that the
patient would have wanted life-support withheld or withdrawn,
the Subjective Test is met and life-support procedures may be
withdrawn. 279 Where there is not "clear and convincing"
evidence, the Principle of Substituted Judgment as enunciated
280
in Quinlan and expanded upon in Jobes should be utilized.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The problems encountered in the area of withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical procedures from chronically or
terminally ill patients and patients in a persistent vegetative state are
complex and are best resolved in the legislative forum. The Illinois
275. Peter, 108 N.J. at 383, 529 A.2d at 429 (1987).
276. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 422, 529 A.2d at 448.
277. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54, 355 A.2d 647, 671, cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
278. The court held that where the patient's physician and the Hospital Ethics
Committee concurred that there was no reasonable possibility of the patient emerging
from his persistent vegetative state, the patient could be withdrawn frmo life-support.
Id.

279. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 426-27, 529 A.2d at 451 (1987).
280. Id.
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Legislature has taken a major step forward by enacting the Illinois
Living Will Act. More work needs to be done, however, to assure
Illinois citizens of a comprehensive scheme to deal with this problem.
This work consists of both changes in the Living Will Act and the
creation of new legislation covering concerns not addressed by the
Act.
DAVID

B. COLLINS

LIVING WILLS
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APPENDIX A
ILLINOIS LIVING WILL ACT
(ORIGINAL VERSION)
LIVING WILL ACT
PAR.
701.

PURPOSE

703.
704.

EXECUTION OF A DOCUMENT. 708.
VERIFICATION OF TERMINAL709.

702.

706.

707.

DEFINITIONS

PHYSICIAN RESPONSIBILITIES.

IMMUNITY.

PENALTIES.
GENERAL PROVISIONS.

ILLNESS.

705.

REVOCATION

OF .DECLARA-710.

SHORT TILE.

TION-FAILURE TO ACT UPON REVOCATION.

701. PURPOSE
§ 1. Purpose. The legislature finds that persons have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of their
own medical care, including the decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition.
In order that the rights of patients may be respected
even after
they are no longer able to participate actively in decisions about
themselves, the legislature hereby declares that the laws of this State
shall recognize the right of a person to make a written declaration
instructing his or her physician to withhold or withdraw life sustaining
procedures in the event of a terminal condition.
P.A. 83-824, § 1 eff. Jan. 1, 1984.
702. Definitions
§ 2. Definitions: (a) "Attending physician" means the physician
selected by, or assigned to the patient who has primary responsibility
for the treatment and care of the patient.
(b) "Declaration" means a witnessed document in writing, voluntarily executed by the declarant in accordance with the requirements
of Section 3.
(c) "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical procedure
or intervention which, when applied to a qualified patient, in the
judgment of the attending physician would serve only to postpone the
moment of death, when death is imminent, except for such procedtfre
or intervention being utilized. "Life-sustaining procedure" shall not
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include the administration of medication or sustenance or the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide
comfort care or to alleviate pain.
(d) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine
in all its branches.
(e) "Qualified patient" means a patient who has executed a
declaration in accordance with this Act and who has been diagnosed
and verified in writing to be afflicted with a terminal condition by his
or her attending physician who has personally examined the patient.
. (f) "Terminal condition" means in incurable condition which
is such that death is imminent and the application of life sustaining
procedures serves only to postpone the moment of death.
P.A. 83-824, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1984.
703. Execution of a document
§ 3. Execution of a Document. (a) An individual of sound mind
and having reached the age of majority or having obtained the status
of an emancipated person pursuant to the "Emancipation of Mature
Minors Act", as now or hereafter amended, may execute a document
directing that if he is suffering from a terminal condition, then life
sustaining procedures shall not be utilized for the prolongation of his
life.
(b) A document described in subsection (a) of this Section is
not valid unless it has been executed with the same formalities as
required of a valid will pursuant to the Probate Act of 1975.
(c) The declaration of a qualified patient diagnosed as pregnant
by the attending physician shall have no effect during the course of
the qualified patient's pregnancy.
(d) It shall be the responsibility of the patient to provide for
notification to his or her attending physician of the existence of the
declaration. An attending physician who is so notified shall make the
declaration, or copy of the declaration, apart of the patient's medical
records.
(e) The declaration shall be substantially in the following form,
but in addition may include other specific directions. Should any of
the other specific directions be held to be invalid, such invalidity shall
not affect other directions of the declaration which can be given effect
without the invalid direction, and to this end the directions in the
declaration are severable.
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DECLARATION
Declaration made this ............
day of..........
(month, year). I.........................,
being of sound
mind, willfully and voluntarily make known by desires that my
moment of death shall not be artificially postponed under the circumstances set forth below, do hereby declare:
If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or
illness judged to be a terminal condition by my attending physician
who has personally examined me, and has determined that my death
is imminent except for life-sustaining procedures, I direct that such
procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die
naturally with only the administration of medication, sustenance, or
the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to
provide me with comfort care.
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use
of such life-sustaining of my ability to give directions regarding the
use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this
declaration shall be honored by my family and physician as the final
expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment
and accept the consequences from such refusal.
I understand the full import of this declaration and am emotionally and mentally competent to make this declaration.
Signed ...............
City, County and State of Residence ...............
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe him or
her to be of sound mind. I did not sign the declarant's signature
above for or at the direction of the declarant. I am not related to the
declarant by blood or marriage, entitled to any portion of the estate
of the declarant according to the laws of intestate succession or under
any will of declarant or codicil thereto, or directly financially responsible for declarant's medical care.
W itness ..............
W itness ..............
P.A. 83-824, § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 1984.
704. Verification of terminal illness
§ 4. Verification of a Terminal Illness. A physician who verifies
in writing a terminal condition under this Section is presumed to be
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acting in good faith. Unless it is alleged and proved that his action
violated the standard of reasonable professional care and judgment
under the circumstances, he is immune from civil or criminal liability
that otherwise might be incurred.
P.A. 83-824, § 4 eff. Jan. 1, 1984.
705. Revocation of declaration-Failure to act upon revocation
§ 5. (a) A declaration may be revoked at any time by the declarant
by any of the following methods:
(1) By being obliterated, burnt, town or otherwise destroyed or
defaced in a manner indicating intention to cancel;
(2) By a written revocation of the declaration signed and dated
by the declarant or person acting at the direction of the declarant; or
(3) By an oral expression of the intent to revoke the declaration,
in the presence of a witness 18 years of age or older who signs and
dates a writing confirming that such expression of intent was made.
Any oral revocation shall become effective upon receipt by the
attending physician of the above mentioned writing. The attending
physician shall record in the patient's record the time, date and place
of when he or she received notification of the revocation.
(b) There shall be no criminal or civil liability on the part of
any person for failure to act upon a revocation made pursuant to this
Section unless that person has actual knowledge of the revocation.
P.A. 83-824, § 5, eff. Jan 1, 1984.
706. Physician responsibilities
§ 6. Physician Responsibilities. (a) An attending physician who
has been notified of the existence of a declaration executed under this
Act, without delay after the diagnosis of a terminal condition of the
patient, shall take the necessary steps to provide for written verification of the patient's terminal condition, so that the patient may be
deemed to be a qualified patient under this Act.
(b) If a physician, because of his or her personal beliefs or
conscience, is unable to comply with the terms of the declaration, the
qualified patient or the family of the qualified patient, may request
the case be referred to another physician.
(c) An attending physician who, because of his or her personal
beliefs or conscience, is unable to comply with the declaration pursuant to this Act shall, without delay, make the necessary arrangements to effect the transfer of the qualified patient, and the appropriate
medical records that qualify said patient to another physician who
has been identified by the qualified patient or by the family of the
qualified patient, for effectuation of the qualified patient's declaration.
P.A. 83-824, § 6, eff. Jan. 1, 1984.
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707. Immunity
§ 7. Immunity. The desires of a qualified patient shall at all times
supersede the effect of the declaration.
If the qualified patient is incompetent at the time of the decision
to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures, a declaration
executed in accordance with Section 3 of this Act is presumed to be
valid. For the purpose of this Act, a physician or medical care facility
may presume in the absence of actual notice to the contrary that an
individual who executed a declaration was of sound mind when it was
executed. The fact of an individual's having executed a declaration
shall not be considered as an indication of a declarant's mental
incompetency. Age of itself shall not be a bar to a determination of
competency.
No physician, licensed health care professional, medical care
facility or employee thereof who in good faith and pursuant to
reasonable medical standards causes or participates i the withholding
or withdrawing of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient
pursuant to a declaration which purports to have been made in
accordance with this Act shall as a result thereof, be subject to
criminal or civil liability, or be found to have committed an act of
unprofessional conduct.
P.A. 83-824, § 7, eff. Jan. 1, 1984.
708. Penalties
§ 8. Penalties. (a) Any person who willfully conceals, cancels,
defaces, obliterates, or damages the declaration of another without
such declarant's consent or who falsifies or forges a revocation of the
declaration of another shall be civilly liable.
(b) Any person who falsifies or forges the declaration of another,
or willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge of a revocation
as provided in Section 5 with the intent to cause a withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures contrary to the wishes of the
qualified patient and thereby, because of such act, directly causes lifesustaining procedures to be withheld or withdrawn and death to
another thereby be hastened, shall be subject to prosecution for
involuntary manslaughter.
P.A. 83-824, § 8, eff. Jan. 1, 1984.
709. General provisions
§ 9. General provisions. (a) The withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient in accordance with
the provisions of this Act shall not, for any purpose,constitute a
suicide.
(b) The making of a declaration pursuant to Section 3 shall not
affect in any manner the sale, procurement, or issuance of any policy
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of life insurance, nor shall it be deemed to modify the terms of an
existing policy of life insurance. No policy of life insurance shall be
legally impaired or invalidated in any manner by the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from an insured qualified
patient, notwithstanding any term of the policy to the contrary.
(c) No physician, medical care facility, or other health care
provider, and no health care service plan, health maintenance organization, insurer issuing disability insurance, self-insured employee
welfare benefit plan, nonprofit medical service corporation or mutual
nonprofit hospital service corporation shall require any person to
execute a declaration as a condition for being insured for, or receiving,
health care services.
(d) Nothing in this Act shall impair or supersede any legal right
or legal responsibility which any person may have to effect the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in any lawful
manner. In such respect the provisions of this Act are cumulative.
(e) This Act shall create no presumption concerning the intention of an individual who has not executed a declaration to consent
to the use or withholding of life-sustaining procedures in the event of
a terminal condition.
(f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to condone, authorize
or approve mercy killing or to permit any affirmative or deliberate
act of omission to end life other than to permit the natural process
of dying as provided in this Act.
P.A. 83-824, § 9, eff. Jan. 1, 1984.
710. Short title
§ 10. This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Illinois
Living Will act". P.A. 83-824, § 10, eff. Jan. 1, 1984.

1988:4271 ,

LIVING WILLS

APPENDIX B
1987 AMENDMENTS TO THE ILLINOIS LIVING WILL ACT
PUBLIC ACT 85-189
HOUSE BILL 175
AN ACT to amend Section 3 of the "Illinois Living Will Act",
approved September 24, 1983.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented
in the General Assembly:
Section 1. Section 3 of the "Illinois Living Will Act", approved
September 24, 183, is amended to read as follows:
(Ch. 110 1/2 par. 703) [S.H.A. ch. 110 1/2 § 703]
Sec. 3. Execution of a Document. (a) An individual of sound
mind and having reached the age of majority of having obtained the
status of an emancipated person pursuant to the "Emancipation of
Mature Minors Act", as now or hereafter amended, may execute a
document directing that if he is suffering from a terminal condition,
then life sustaining procedures shall not be utilized for the prolongation of his life.
(b) A document described in subsection (a) of
this Section is
not valid unless it has been executed with the same formalities as
required of a valid will pursuant to the Probate Act of 1975.
(c) The declaration of a qualified patient diagnosed as pregnant
by the attending physician shall have no effect during the course of
the qualified patient's pregnancy.
(d) It shall be the responsibility of the patient to provide for
notification to his or her attending physician of the existence of the
declaration. An attending physician who is so notified shall make the
declaration, or copy of the declaration, apart of the patient's medical
records.
(e) The declaration shall be substantially in the following form,
but in addition may include other specific directions. Should any of
the other specific directions be held to be invalid, such invalidity shall
not affect other directions of the declaration which can be given effect
without the invalid direction, and to this end the directions in the
declaration are severable.
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DECLARATION
(month,
day of ..........
Declaration made this ............
mind,
sound
of
,
being
year). I ............................
willfully and voluntarily make known by desires that my moment of
death shall not be artificially postponed under the circumstances set
forth below, do hereby declare:
If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or
illness judged to be a terminal condition by my attending physician
who has personally examined me, and has determined that my death
is imminent except for life-sustaining procedures, I direct that such
procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die
naturally with only the administration of medication, sustenance, or
the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to
provide me with comfort care.
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use
of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this declaration shall be honored by my family and physician as the final
expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment
and accept the consequences from such refusal.
I understand the full import of this declaration and am emotionally and mentally competent to make this declaration.
Signed ..............
City, County and State of Residence ..............
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe him or
her to be of sound mind. I saw the declarant sign the declaration in
my presence (or the declarant acknowledged in my presence that he
had signed the declaration)and I signed the declaration as a witness
in the presence of the declarant.I did not sign the declarant's signature
above for or at the direction of the declarant. I am not related to the
declarant by blood or marriage, entitled to any portion of the estate
of the declarant according to the laws of intestate succession or under
any will of declarant or codicil thereto, or directly financially responsible for declarant's medical care.
W itness ..............
W itness .. ............
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LIVING WILLS
PUBLIC ACT 85-860
SENATE BILL 1147

AN ACT to amend Sections 1 through 9 of the "Illinois Living

Will Act", approved September 24, 1983.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented

in the General Assembly:

Section 1. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the "Illinois
Living Will Act", approved September 24, 1983, are amended to read

as follows:
(Ch. 110 1/2 par. 701) [S.H.A. ch. 110 1/2, § 701]
Sec. 1. Purpose. The legislature finds that persons have the
fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering
of their own medical care, including the decision to have death
delaying procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal
condition.
In order that the rights of patients may be respected even after
they are no longer able to participate actively in decisions about
themselves, the legislature hereby declares that the laws of this State
shall recognize the right of a person to make a written declaration
instructing his or her physician to withhold or withdraw death delaying
procedures in the event of a terminal condition.
(Ch. 110 1/2, par. 702) [S.H.A. ch. 110 1/2, § 702
Sec. 2. Definitions: (a) "Attending physician" means the physician selected by, or assigned to the patient who has primary responsibility for the treatment and care of the patient.
(b) "Declaration" means a witnessed document in writing, voluntarily executed by the declarant in accordance with the requirements
of Section 3.
(c) "Health-care provider" means a person who is licensed,
certified or otherwise authorized by the law of this State to administer
health care in the ordinary course of business or practice of a
profession.
(d) "Death-delaying procedure" means any medical procedure
or intervention which, when applied to a qualified patient, in the
judgment of the attending physician would serve only to postpone the
moment of death. In appropriate circumstances, such procedures
include, but are not limited to, assisted ventilation, artificial kidney
treatments, intravenous feeding or medication, blood transfusions,
tube feeding and other procedures of greater or lesser magnitude that
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serve only to delay death. However, this Act does not affect the
responsibility of the attending physician or other health care provide
to provide treatment for a patient's comfort care or alleviation of
pain. Nutrition and hydration shall not be withdrawn or withheld
from a qualifiedpatient if the withdrawal or withholding would result
in death solely from dehydration or starvation rather than from the
existing condition.
(e) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust,
estate, trust, partnership,association, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal entity.
(f) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine in
all its branches.
(g) "Qualified patient" means a patient who has executed a
declaration in accordance with this Act and who has been diagnosed
and verified in writing to be afflicted with a terminal condition by his
or her attending physician who has personally examined the patient.
A qualified patient has the right to make decisions regarding death
delaying procedures as long as he or she is able to do so.
(h) "Terminal condition" means in incurable and irreversible
condition which is such that death is imminent and the application of
death delaying procedures serves only to prolong the dying process.
(Ch. 110 1/2, par. 703) [S.H.A. ch. 110 1/2, § 703]
Sec. 3. Execution of a Document. (a) An individual of sound
mind and having reached the age of majority or having obtained the
status of an emancipated person pursuant to the "Emancipation of
Mature Minors Act", as now or hereafter amended, may execute a
document directing that if he is suffering from a terminal condition,
then death delaying procedures shall not be utilized for the prolongation of his life.
(b) The declarationmust be signed by the declarant, or another
at the declarant's direction, and witnessed by 2 individuals 18 years
of age or older.
(c) The declaration of a qualified patient diagnosed as pregnant
by the attending physician shall be given no force and effect as long
as in the opinion of the attending physician it is possible that the
fetus could develop to the point of live birth with the continued
application of death delaying purposes.
(d) If the patient is able, it shall be the responsibility of the
patient to provide for notification to his or her attending physician
of the existence of a declaration, to provide the declaration to the
physician and to ask the attending physician whether he or she is
willing to comply with its provisions. An attending physician who is
so notified shall make the declaration, or copy of the declaration,
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apart of the patient's medical records. If the physician is at any time
unwilling to comply with its provisions, the physician shall promptly
so advise the declarant. If the physician is unwilling to comply with
its provisions and the patient is able, it is the patient's responsibility
to initiate the transfer to anotherphysician of the patient's choosing.
If the physician is unwilling to comply with its provisions and the
patients is at any time not able to initiate the transfer, then the
attending physician shall without delay notify the person with the
highest priority, as set forth in this subsection, who is available, able,
and willing to make arrangementsfor the transfer of the patient and
the appropriatemedical records to anotherphysician for the effectuation of the patient's declaration. The order of priority is as follows:
(1) any person authorized by the patient to make such arrangements,
(2) a guardian of the person of the patient, without the necessity of
obtaining a court order to do so, and (3) any member of the patient's
family.
(e) The declaration may, but need not, be in the following form,
and in addition may include other specific directions. Should any
specific direction be determined .to be invalid, such invalidity shall
not affect other directions of the declaration which can be given effect
without the invalid direction, and to this end the directions in the
declaration are severable.
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DECLARATION
day of
This declaration is made this .............
I
...........................
year).
(month,
..........
being of sound mind, willfully and voluntarily make known by desires
that my moment of death shall not be artificially postponed.
If at any time I should have an incurable and irreversible injury,
disease, or illness judged to be a terminal condition by my attending
physician who has personally examined me, and has determined that
my death is imminent except for death delaying procedures, I direct
that such procedures which would only prolong the dying process be
withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally with
only the administration of medication, sustenance, or the performance
of any medical procedure deemed necessary by my attendingphysician
to provide me with comfort care.
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use
of such death delaying procedures, it is my intention that this declaration shall be honored by my family and physician as the final
expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment
and accept the consequences from such refusal.
Signed ...............
City, County and State of Residence .............
The declarant is personally known to me and I believe him or her to
be of sound mind. I did not sign the declarant's signature above for
or at the direction of the declarant. At the date of this instrument, I
am not entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant according
to the laws of intestate succession or, to the best of my knowledge
and belief, under any will of declarant or other instrument taking
effect at declarant's death or directly financially responsible for
declarant's medical care.
W itness ..............
W itness ..............
(Ch. 110 1/2, par. 704) [S.H.A. ch. 110 1/2, § 704]
Sec. 4. Recording of a Terminal Condition. Upon determining
that the declarant has a terminal condition, the attending physician
who knows of a declaration shall record the determination and the
terms of the declarationin the declarant'smedical record. A physician
who records in writing a terminal condition under this Section is
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presumed to be acting in good faith. Unless it is alleged and proved
that his action violated the standard of reasonable professional care
and judgment under the circumstances, he is immune from civil or
criminal liability that otherwise might be incurred.
(Ch. 110 1/2, par. 705) [S.H.A. ch. 110 1/2, § 705]
Sec. 5. Revocation. (a) A declaration may be revoked at any time
by the declarant, without any regard to declarant'smental or physical
condition, by any of the following methods:
(1) By being obliterated, burnt, town or otherwise destroyed or
defaced in a manner indicating intention to cancel;
(2) By a written revocation of the declaration signed and dated
by the declarant or person acting at the direction of the declarant; or
(3) By an oral or any other expression of the intent to revoke
the declaration, in the presence of a witness 18 years of age or older
who signs and dates a writing confirming that such expression of
intent was made.
(b) A revocation is effective upon communication to the attending physician by the declarant or by another who witnessed the
revocation. The attending physician shall record in the patient's record
the time and date when and the place where he or she received
notification of the revocation.
(c) There shall be no criminal or civil liability on the part of
any person for failure to act upon a revocation made pursuant to this
Section unless that person has actual knowledge of the revocation.
(Ch. 110 1/2, par. 706) [S.H.A. ch. actual knowledge of the
revocation.
(Ch. 110 1/2, par. 706) [S.H.A. ch. actual knowledge of the
revocation.
(Ch. 110 1/2, par. 706) [S.H.A. ch. 110 1/2, § 706]
Sec. 6. Physician Responsibilities. (a) An 110 1/2, § 706]
Sec. 6. Physician Responsibilities. (a) An attending physician who
has been notified of the existence of a declaration executed under this
Act, without delay after the diagnosis of a terminal condition of the
patient, shall take the necessary steps to provide for written recording
of the patient's terminal condition, so that the patient may be deemed
to be a qualified patient under this Act, or shall notify the patient
or, if the patient is unable to initiate a transfer, the person or persons
described in subsection (d) of Section 3 in the order of priority stated
therein that the physician is unwilling to comply with the provisions
of the patient's declaration.
(Ch. 110 1/2, par. 707) [S.H.A. ch. 110 1/2, § 707]
Sec. 7. Immunity. The desires of a qualified patient shall at all
times supersede the effect of the declaration.
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A physician or other health-careprovider may presume, in the
absence of knowledge to the contrary, that a declaration complies
with this Act and is valid.
No physician, health care provider or employee thereof who in
good faith and pursuant to reasonable medical standards causes or
participates i the withholding or withdrawing of death delaying procedures from a qualified patient pursuant to a declaration which
purports to have been made in accordance with this Act shall as a
result thereof, be subject to criminal or civil liability, or be found to
have committed an act of unprofessional conduct.
(Ch. 110 1/2, par. 708) [S.H.A. ch. 110 1/2, § 708]
Sec. 8. Penalties. (a) Any person who willfully conceals, cancels,
defaces, obliterates, or damages the declaration of another without
such declarant's consent or who falsifies or forges a revocation of the
declaration of another or who willfully fails to comply with Section
6 shall be civilly liable.
(b) Any person who coerces or fraudulently induces another to
execute a declarationor falsifies or forges the declaration of another,
or willfully conceals or withholds with the intent to cause a withholding or withdrawal of death delaying procedures contrary to the wishes
of the qualified patient and thereby, because of such act, directly
causes death delaying procedures to be withheld or withdrawn and
death to another thereby be hastened, shall be subject to prosecution
for involuntary manslaughter.
(c) A physician or other health-careprovider who willfully fails
to notify the health care facility or fails to comply with Section 6 is
guilty of engaging in unethical and unprofessionalconduct in violation
of paragraph5 of Section 4433 of the Medical PracticeAct.
(d) A physician who willfully fails to record the determination
of terminal condition in accordance with Section 4, without giving
the notice required by Section 6 of his unwillingness to comply with
the provisions of the patient's declaration, is guilty of willfully
omitting to file or record medical reports as required by law in
violation f paragraph22 of Section 16 of the Medical PracticeAct.
(e) A person who requires or prohibits the execution of a
declarationas a condition for being insuredfor, or receiving, healthcare services is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(f) The penalties provided in this Section do not displace any
penalty applicable under other law.
(Ch. 110 1/2, par. 709) [S.H.A. ch. 110 1/2, § 709]
Sec. 9. General provisions. (a) The withholding or withdrawal of
death delaying procedures from a qualified patient in accordance with
the provisions of this Act shall not, for any purpose,constitute a
suicide.
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(b) The making of a declaration pursuant to Section 3 shall not
affect in any manner the sale, procurement, or issuance of any policy
of life insurance, nor shall it be deemed to modify the terms of an
existing policy of life insurance. No policy of life insurance shall be
legally impaired or invalidated in any manner by the withholding or
withdrawal of death delaying procedures from an insured qualified
patient, notwithstanding any term of the policy to the contrary.
(c) No physician, health care facility, or other health care provider, and no health care service plan, health maintenance organization, insurer issuing disability insurance, self-insured employee welfare
benefit plan, nonprofit medical service corporation or mutual nonprofit hospital service corporation shall require any person to execute
a declaration as a condition for being insured for, or receiving, health
care services.
(d) Nothing in this Act shall impair or supersede any legal right
or legal responsibility which any person may have to effect the
withholding or withdrawal of death delaying procedures in any lawful
manner. In such respect the provisions of this Act are cumulative.
(e) This Act shall create no presumption concerning the intention of an individual who has not executed a declaration to consent
to the use or withholding of death delaying procedures in the event
of a terminal condition.
(f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to condone, authorize
or approve mercy killing or to permit any affirmative or deliberate
act of omission to end life other than to permit the natural process
of dying as provided in this Act.
(g) An instrument executed before the effective date of this Act
that substantially complies with paragraph(e) of Section 3 shall be
given effect pursuant to the provisions of this Act.
(h) A declaration executed in another state in compliance with
the law of that state or this State is validly executed for purposes of
this Act, and such declarationshall be applied in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
APPROVED: September 24, 1987

EFFECTIVE: January 1, 1988

